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Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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The noun “consciousness” has an equally diverse range of meanings that largely parallel those of the adjective “conscious”. Distinctions can be ... StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy Menu Browse TableofContents What'sNew RandomEntry Chronological Archives About EditorialInformation AbouttheSEP EditorialBoard HowtoCitetheSEP SpecialCharacters AdvancedTools Contact SupportSEP SupporttheSEP PDFsforSEPFriends MakeaDonation SEPIAforLibraries EntryNavigation EntryContents Bibliography AcademicTools FriendsPDFPreview AuthorandCitationInfo BacktoTop ConsciousnessFirstpublishedFriJun18,2004;substantiverevisionTueJan14,2014 Perhapsnoaspectofmindismorefamiliarormorepuzzlingthan consciousnessandourconsciousexperienceofselfandworld.The problemofconsciousnessisarguablythecentralissueincurrent theorizingaboutthemind.Despitethelackofanyagreedupontheory ofconsciousness,thereisawidespread,iflessthanuniversal, consensusthatanadequateaccountofmindrequiresaclear understandingofitanditsplaceinnature.Weneedtounderstandboth whatconsciousnessisandhowitrelatestoother,nonconscious,aspects ofreality. 1.Historyoftheissue 2.ConceptsofConsciousness 2.1CreatureConsciousness 2.2Stateconsciousness 2.3Consciousnessasanentity 3.ProblemsofConsciousness 4.Thedescriptivequestion:Whatarethefeaturesofconsciousness? 4.1First-personandthird-persondata 4.2Qualitativecharacter 4.3Phenomenalstructure 4.4Subjectivity 4.5Self-perspectivalorganization 4.6Unity 4.7Intentionalityandtransparency 4.8Dynamicflow 5.Theexplanatoryquestion:Howcanconsciousnessexist? 5.1Diversityofexplanatoryprojects 5.2Theexplanatorygap 5.3Reductiveandnon-reductiveexplanation 5.4Prospectsofexplanatorysuccess 6.Thefunctionalquestion:Whydoesconsciousnessexist? 6.1Causalstatusofconsciousness 6.2Flexiblecontrol 6.3Socialcoordination 6.4Integratedrepresentation 6.5Informationalaccess 6.6Freedomofwill 6.7Intrinsicmotivation 6.8Constitutiveandcontingentroles 7.Theoriesofconsciousness 8.Metaphysicaltheoriesofconsciousness 8.1Dualisttheories 8.2Physicalisttheories 9.SpecificTheoriesofConsciousness 9.1Higher-ordertheories 9.2Reflexivetheories 9.3Representationalisttheories 9.4NarrativeInterpretativeTheories 9.5CognitiveTheories 9.6InformationIntegrationTheory 9.7NeuralTheories 9.8Quantumtheories 9.9Non-physicaltheories 10.Conclusion Bibliography AcademicTools OtherInternetResources RelatedEntries 1.Historyoftheissue Questionsaboutthenatureofconsciousawarenesshavelikelybeen askedforaslongastherehavebeenhumans.Neolithicburialpractices appeartoexpressspiritualbeliefsandprovideearlyevidenceforat leastminimallyreflectivethoughtaboutthenatureofhuman consciousness(Pearson1999,ClarkandRiel-Salvatore2001). Preliteratecultureshavesimilarlybeenfoundinvariablytoembrace someformofspiritualoratleastanimistviewthatindicatesadegree ofreflectionaboutthenatureofconsciousawareness. Nonetheless,somehavearguedthatconsciousnessasweknowittoday isarelativelyrecenthistoricaldevelopmentthatarosesometimeafter theHomericera(Jaynes1974).Accordingtothisview,earlierhumans includingthosewhofoughttheTrojanWardidnotexperiencethemselves asunifiedinternalsubjectsoftheirthoughtsandactions,atleast notinthewayswedotoday.Othershaveclaimedthatevenduringthe classicalperiod,therewasnowordofancientGreekthatcorresponds to“consciousness”(Wilkes1984,1988,1995).Thoughthe ancientshadmuchtosayaboutmentalmatters,itislessclearwhether theyhadanyspecificconceptsorconcernsforwhatwenowthinkofas consciousness. Althoughthewords“conscious”and “conscience”areusedquitedifferentlytoday,itislikely thattheReformationemphasisonthelatterasaninnersourceoftruth playedsomeroleintheinwardturnsocharacteristicofthemodern reflectiveviewofself.TheHamletwhowalkedthestagein1600 alreadysawhisworldandselfwithprofoundlymoderneyes. Bythebeginningoftheearlymoderneraintheseventeenthcentury, consciousnesshadcomefullcenterinthinkingaboutthemind.Indeed fromthemid-17ththroughthelate19thcentury,consciousnesswas widelyregardedasessentialordefinitiveofthemental.René Descartesdefinedtheverynotionofthought(pensée)intermsof reflexiveconsciousnessorself-awareness.InthePrinciplesof Philosophy(1640)hewrote, Bytheword‘thought’ (‘pensée’)Iunderstandallthatofwhichweare consciousasoperatinginus. Later,towardtheendofthe17thcentury,JohnLockeoffereda similarifslightlymorequalifiedclaiminAnEssayonHuman Understanding(1688), Idonotsaythereisnosoulinmanbecauseheisnot sensibleofitinhissleep.ButIdosayhecannotthinkatanytime, wakingorsleeping,withoutbeingsensibleofit.Ourbeingsensibleof itisnotnecessarytoanythingbutourthoughts,andtothemitisand tothemitalwayswillbenecessary. Lockeexplicitlyforsworemakinganyhypothesisaboutthe substantialbasisofconsciousnessanditsrelationtomatter,buthe clearlyregardeditasessentialtothoughtaswellastopersonal identity. Locke'scontemporaryG.W.Leibniz,drawingpossibleinspirationfrom hismathematicalworkondifferentiationandintegration,offereda theoryofmindintheDiscourseonMetaphysics(1686)that allowedforinfinitelymanydegreesofconsciousnessandperhapseven forsomethoughtsthatwereunconscious,thesocalled“petites perceptions”.Leibnizwasthefirsttodistinguishexplicitly betweenperceptionandapperception,i.e.,roughlybetweenawareness andself-awareness.IntheMonadology(1720)healsooffered hisfamousanalogyofthemilltoexpresshisbeliefthatconsciousness couldnotarisefrommerematter.Heaskedhisreadertoimagine someonewalkingthroughanexpandedbrainasonewouldwalkthrougha millandobservingallitsmechanicaloperations,whichforLeibniz exhausteditsphysicalnature.Nowhere,heasserts,wouldsuchan observerseeanyconsciousthoughts. DespiteLeibniz'srecognitionofthepossibilityofunconscious thought,formostofthenexttwocenturiesthedomainsofthoughtand consciousnesswereregardedasmoreorlessthesame.Associationist psychology,whetherpursuedbyLockeorlaterintheeighteenthcentury byDavidHume(1739)orinthenineteenthbyJamesMill(1829),aimed todiscovertheprinciplesbywhichconsciousthoughtsorideas interactedoraffectedeachother.JamesMill'sson,JohnStuartMill continuedhisfather'sworkonassociationistpsychology,buthe allowedthatcombinationsofideasmightproduceresultantsthatwent beyondtheirconstituentmentalparts,thusprovidinganearlymodelof mentalemergence(1865). Thepurelyassociationistapproachwascritiquedinthelate eighteenthcenturybyImmanuelKant(1787),whoarguedthatanadequate accountofexperienceandphenomenalconsciousnessrequiredafar richerstructureofmentalandintentionalorganization.Phenomenal consciousnessaccordingtoKantcouldnotbeameresuccessionof associatedideas,butataminimumhadtobetheexperienceofa consciousselfsituatedinanobjectiveworldstructuredwithrespect tospace,timeandcausality. WithintheAnglo-Americanworld,associationistapproachescontinued tobeinfluentialinbothphilosophyandpsychologywellintothe twentiethcentury,whileintheGermanandEuropeanspheretherewasa greaterinterestinthelargerstructureofexperiencethatledin parttothestudyofphenomenologythroughtheworkofEdmundHusserl (1913,1929),MartinHeidegger(1927),MauriceMerleau-Ponty(1945)and otherswhoexpandedthestudyofconsciousnessintotherealmofthe social,thebodilyandtheinterpersonal. Attheoutsetofmodernscientificpsychologyinthemid-nineteenth century,themindwasstilllargelyequatedwithconsciousness,and introspectivemethodsdominatedthefieldasintheworkofWilhelm Wundt(1897),HermannvonHelmholtz(1897),WilliamJames(1890)and AlfredTitchener(1901).However,therelationofconsciousnessto brainremainedverymuchamysteryasexpressedinT.H.Huxley's famousremark, Howitisthatanythingsoremarkableasastateof consciousnesscomesaboutasaresultofirritatingnervoustissue,is justasunaccountableastheappearanceoftheDjin,whenAladdin rubbedhislamp(1866). Theearlytwentiethcenturysawtheeclipseofconsciousnessfrom scientificpsychology,especiallyintheUnitedStateswiththeriseof behaviorism(Watson1924,Skinner1953)thoughmovementssuchas Gestaltpsychologykeptitamatterofongoingscientificconcernin Europe(Köhler1929,Köffka1935).Inthe1960s,thegripof behaviorismweakenedwiththeriseofcognitivepsychologyandits emphasisoninformationprocessingandthemodelingofinternalmental processes(Neisser1965,Gardiner1985).However,despitetherenewed emphasisonexplainingcognitivecapacitiessuchasmemory,perception andlanguagecomprehension,consciousnessremainedalargelyneglected topicforseveralfurtherdecades. Inthe1980sand90stherewasamajorresurgenceofscientificand philosophicalresearchintothenatureandbasisofconsciousness (Baars1988,Dennett1991,Penrose1989,1994,Crick1994,Lycan1987, 1996,Chalmers1996).Onceconsciousnesswasbackunderdiscussion, therewasarapidproliferationofresearchwithafloodofbooksand articles,aswellastheintroductionofspecialtyjournals(The JournalofConsciousnessStudies,ConsciousnessandCognition, Psyche),professionalsocieties(AssociationfortheScientific StudyofConsciousness—ASSC)andannualconferencesdevoted exclusivelytoitsinvestigation(“TheScienceof Consciousness”). 2.ConceptsofConsciousness Thewords“conscious”and“consciousness” areumbrellatermsthatcoverawidevarietyofmentalphenomena.Both areusedwithadiversityofmeanings,andtheadjective “conscious”isheterogeneousinitsrange,beingapplied bothtowholeorganisms—creatureconsciousness—andto particularmentalstatesandprocesses—stateconsciousness (Rosenthal1986,Gennaro1995,Carruthers2000). 2.1CreatureConsciousness Ananimal,personorothercognitivesystemmayberegardedas consciousinanumberofdifferentsenses. Sentience.Itmaybeconsciousinthegenericsenseof simplybeingasentientcreature,onecapableofsensingand respondingtoitsworld(Armstrong1981).Beingconsciousinthissense mayadmitofdegrees,andjustwhatsortofsensorycapacitiesare sufficientmaynotbesharplydefined.Arefishconsciousinthe relevantrespect?Andwhatofshrimporbees? Wakefulness.Onemightfurtherrequirethattheorganism actuallybeexercisingsuchacapacityratherthanmerelyhavingthe abilityordispositiontodoso.Thusonemightcountitasconscious onlyifitwereawakeandnormallyalert.Inthatsense organismswouldnotcountasconsciouswhenasleeporinanyofthe deeperlevelsofcoma.Againboundariesmaybeblurry,andintermediate casesmaybeinvolved.Forexample,isoneconsciousintherelevant sensewhendreaming,hypnotizedorinafuguestate? Self-consciousness.Athirdandyetmoredemandingsense mightdefineconsciouscreaturesasthosethatarenotonlyawarebut alsoawarethattheyareaware,thustreatingcreatureconsciousnessas aformofself-consciousness(Carruthers2000).The self-awarenessrequirementmightgetinterpretedinavarietyofways, andwhichcreatureswouldqualifyasconsciousintherelevantsense willvaryaccordingly.Ifitistakentoinvolveexplicitconceptual self-awareness,manynon-humananimalsandevenyoungchildrenmight failtoqualify,butifonlymorerudimentaryimplicitformsof self-awarenessarerequiredthenawiderangeofnonlinguistic creaturesmightcountasself-conscious. Whatitislike.ThomasNagel's(1974) famous“whatitislike”criterionaimstocapture anotherandperhapsmoresubjectivenotionofbeingaconscious organism.AccordingtoNagel,abeingisconsciousjustifthereis “somethingthatitislike”tobethatcreature,i.e.,some subjectivewaytheworldseemsorappearsfromthecreature'smentalor experientialpointofview.InNagel'sexample,batsareconscious becausethereissomethingthatitislikeforabattoexperienceits worldthroughitsecho-locatorysenses,eventhoughwehumansfromour humanpointofviewcannotemphaticallyunderstandwhatsuchamodeof consciousnessislikefromthebat'sownpointofview. Subjectofconsciousstates.Afifthalternativewouldbe todefinethenotionofaconsciousorganismintermsofconscious states.Thatis,onemightfirstdefinewhatmakesamentalstatea consciousmentalstate,andthendefinebeingaconsciouscreaturein termsofhavingsuchstates.One'sconceptofaconsciousorganism wouldthendependupontheparticularaccountonegivesofconscious states(section2.2). TransitiveConsciousness.Inadditiontodescribing creaturesasconsciousinthesevarioussenses,therearealsorelated sensesinwhichcreaturesaredescribedasbeingconsciousof variousthings.Thedistinctionissometimesmarkedasthatbetween transitiveandintransitivenotionsofconsciousness, withtheformerinvolvingsomeobjectatwhichconsciousnessis directed(Rosenthal1986). 2.2Stateconsciousness Thenotionofaconsciousmentalstatealsohasavarietyof distinctthoughperhapsinterrelatedmeanings.Thereareatleastsix majoroptions. Statesoneisawareof.Ononecommonreading,aconscious mentalstateissimplyamentalstateoneisawareofbeingin (Rosenthal1986,1996).Consciousstatesinthissenseinvolveaform ofmeta-mentalityormeta-intentionalityinsofaras theyrequirementalstatesthatarethemselvesaboutmentalstates.To haveaconsciousdesireforacupofcoffeeistohavesuchadesire andalsotobesimultaneouslyanddirectlyawarethatonehassucha desire.Unconsciousthoughtsanddesiresinthissensearesimply thosewehavewithoutbeingawareofhavingthem,whetherourlackof self-knowledgeresultsfromsimpleinattentionormoredeeply psychoanalyticcauses. Qualitativestates.Statesmightalsoberegardedas consciousinaseeminglyquitedifferentandmorequalitative sense.Thatis,onemightcountastateasconsciousjustifithasor involvesqualitativeorexperientialpropertiesofthesortoften referredtoas“qualia”or“rawsensoryfeels”. (Seetheentryon qualia.) One'sperceptionoftheMerlotoneisdrinkingorofthefabricone isexaminingcountsasaconsciousmentalstateinthissensebecause itinvolvesvarioussensoryqualia,e.g.,tastequaliainthewine caseandcolorqualiainone'svisualexperienceofthecloth.There isconsiderabledisagreementaboutthenatureofsuchqualia (Churchland1985,Shoemaker1990,Clark1993,Chalmers1996)andeven abouttheirexistence.Traditionallyqualiahavebeenregardedas intrinsic,private,ineffablemonadicfeaturesofexperience,but currenttheoriesofqualiaoftenrejectatleastsomeofthose commitments(Dennett1990). Phenomenalstates.Suchqualiaaresometimesreferredtoas phenomenalpropertiesandtheassociatedsortofconsciousnessas phenomenalconsciousness,butthelattertermisperhapsmore properlyappliedtotheoverallstructureofexperienceandinvolves farmorethansensoryqualia.Thephenomenalstructureofconsciousness alsoencompassesmuchofthespatial,temporalandconceptual organizationofourexperienceoftheworldandofourselvesasagents init.(Seesection 4.3) Itisthereforeprobably best,atleastinitially,todistinguishtheconceptofphenomenal consciousnessfromthatofqualitativeconsciousness,thoughtheyno doubtoverlap. What-it-is-likestates.Consciousnessinboththosesenses linksupaswellwithThomasNagel's(1974)notionofaconscious creature,insofarasonemightcountamentalstateasconsciousinthe “whatitislike”sensejustifthereissomething thatitisliketobeinthatstate.Nagel'scriterionmightbe understoodasaimingtoprovideafirst-personorinternalconception ofwhatmakesastateaphenomenalorqualitativestate. Accessconsciousness.Statesmightbeconsciousina seeminglyquitedifferentaccesssense,whichhasmoretodowith intra-mentalrelations.Inthisrespect,astate'sbeingconsciousisa matterofitsavailabilitytointeractwithotherstatesandofthe accessthatonehastoitscontent.Inthismorefunctionalsense, whichcorrespondstowhatNedBlock(1995)callsaccess consciousness,avisualstate'sbeingconsciousisnotsomucha matterofwhetherornotithasaqualitative“whatit's likeness”,butofwhetherornotitandthevisualinformation thatitcarriesisgenerallyavailableforuseandguidancebythe organism.Insofarastheinformationinthatstateisrichlyand flexiblyavailabletoitscontainingorganism,thenitcountsasa consciousstateintherelevantrespect,whetherornotithasany qualitativeorphenomenalfeelintheNagelsense. Narrativeconsciousness.Statesmightalsoberegardedas consciousinanarrativesensethatappealstothenotionof the“streamofconsciousness”,regardedasanongoingmore orlessserialnarrativeofepisodesfromtheperspectiveofanactual ormerelyvirtualself.Theideawouldbetoequatetheperson's consciousmentalstateswiththosethatappearinthestream(Dennett 1991,1992). Althoughthesesixnotionsofwhatmakesastateconsciouscanbe independentlyspecified,theyareobviouslynotwithoutpotential links,nordotheyexhausttherealmofpossibleoptions.Drawing connections,onemightarguethatstatesappearinthestreamof consciousnessonlyinsofarasweareawareofthem,andthusforgea bondbetweenthefirstmeta-mentalnotionofaconsciousstateandthe streamornarrativeconcept.Oronemightconnecttheaccesswiththe qualitativeorphenomenalnotionsofaconsciousstatebytryingto showthatstatesthatrepresentinthosewaysmaketheircontents widelyavailableintherespectrequiredbytheaccessnotion. Aimingtogobeyondthesixoptions,onemightdistinguishconscious fromnonconsciousstatesbyappealtoaspectsoftheirintra-mental dynamicsandinteractionsotherthanmereaccessrelations;e.g., consciousstatesmightmanifestaricherstockofcontent-sensitive interactionsoragreaterdegreeofflexiblepurposiveguidanceofthe sortassociatedwiththeself-consciouscontrolofthought. Alternatively,onemighttrytodefineconsciousstatesintermsof consciouscreatures.Thatis,onemightgivesomeaccountofwhatitis tobeaconsciouscreatureorperhapsevenaconsciousself,andthen defineone'snotionofaconsciousstateintermsofbeingastateof suchacreatureorsystem,whichwouldbetheconverseofthelast optionconsideredabovefordefiningconsciouscreaturesintermsof consciousmentalstates. 2.3Consciousnessasanentity Thenoun“consciousness”hasanequallydiverserangeof meaningsthatlargelyparallelthoseoftheadjective “conscious”.Distinctionscanbedrawnbetweencreatureand stateconsciousnessaswellasamongthevarietiesofeach.Onecan referspecificallytophenomenalconsciousness,accessconsciousness, reflexiveormeta-mentalconsciousness,andnarrativeconsciousness amongothervarieties. Hereconsciousnessitselfisnottypicallytreatedasasubstantive entitybutmerelytheabstractreificationofwhateverpropertyor aspectisattributedbytherelevantuseoftheadjective “conscious”.Accessconsciousnessisjustthepropertyof havingtherequiredsortofinternalaccessrelations,andqualitative consciousnessissimplythepropertythatisattributedwhen “conscious”isappliedinthequalitativesensetomental states.Howmuchthiscommitsonetotheontologicalstatusof consciousnesspersewilldependonhowmuchofaPlatonistoneis aboutuniversalsingeneral.(Seetheentryon themedievalproblemofuniversals.) Itneednotcommitonetoconsciousnessasadistinctentityanymore thanone'suseof“square”,“red”or “gentle”commitsonetotheexistenceofsquareness, rednessorgentlenessasdistinctentities. Thoughitisnotthenorm,onecouldnonethelesstakeamore robustlyrealistviewofconsciousnessasacomponentofreality.That isonecouldthinkofconsciousnessasmoreonaparwith electromagneticfieldsthanwithlife. Sincethedemiseofvitalism,wedonotthinkoflifeper seassomethingdistinctfromlivingthings.Thereareliving thingsincludingorganisms,states,propertiesandpartsoforganisms, communitiesandevolutionarylineagesoforganisms,butlifeisnot itselfafurtherthing,anadditionalcomponentofreality,somevital forcethatgetsaddedintolivingthings.Weapplytheadjectives “living”and“alive”correctlytomanythings, andindoingsowemightbesaidtobeattributinglifetothembut withnomeaningorrealityotherthanthatinvolvedintheirbeing livingthings. Electromagneticfieldsbycontrastareregardedasrealand independentpartsofourphysicalworld.Eventhoughonemaysometimes beabletospecifythevaluesofsuchafieldbyappealtothebehavior ofparticlesinit,thefieldsthemselvesareregardedasconcrete constituentsofrealityandnotmerelyasabstractionsorsetsof relationsamongparticles. Similarlyonecouldregard“consciousness”asreferring toacomponentoraspectofrealitythatmanifestsitselfinconscious statesandcreaturesbutismorethanmerelytheabstract nominalizationoftheadjective“conscious”weapplyto them.Thoughsuchstronglyrealistviewsarenotverycommonat present,theyshouldbeincludedwithinthelogicalspaceof options. Therearethusmanyconceptsofconsciousness,andboth “conscious”and“consciousness”areusedina widerangeofwayswithnoprivilegedorcanonicalmeaning.However, thismaybelessofanembarrassmentthananembarrassmentofriches. Consciousnessisacomplexfeatureoftheworld,andunderstandingit willrequireadiversityofconceptualtoolsfordealingwithitsmany differingaspects.Conceptualpluralityisthusjustwhatonewould hopefor.Aslongasoneavoidsconfusionbybeingclearaboutone's meanings,thereisgreatvalueinhavingavarietyofconceptsbywhich wecanaccessandgraspconsciousnessinallitsrichcomplexity. However,oneshouldnotassumethatconceptualpluralityimplies referentialdivergence.Ourmultipleconceptsofconsciousnessmayin factpickoutvaryingaspectsofasingleunifiedunderlyingmental phenomenon.Whetherandtowhatextenttheydosoremainsanopen question. 3.ProblemsofConsciousness Thetaskofunderstandingconsciousnessisanequallydiverse project.Notonlydomanydifferentaspectsofmindcountasconscious insomesense,eachisalsoopentovariousrespectsinwhichitmight beexplainedormodeled.Understandingconsciousnessinvolvesa multiplicitynotonlyofexplanandabutalsoofquestionsthatthey poseandthesortsofanswerstheyrequire.Attheriskof oversimplifying,therelevantquestionscanbegatheredunderthree cruderubricsastheWhat,How,andWhyquestions: TheDescriptiveQuestion:Whatisconsciousness?Whatare itsprincipalfeatures?Andbywhatmeanscantheybebestdiscovered, describedandmodeled? TheExplanatoryQuestion:Howdoesconsciousnessofthe relevantsortcometoexist?Isitaprimitiveaspectofreality,and ifnothowdoes(orcould)consciousnessintherelevantrespectarise fromorbecausedbynonconsciousentitiesorprocesses? TheFunctionalQuestion:Whydoesconsciousnessofthe relevantsortexist?Doesithaveafunction,andifsowhatisit? Doesitactcausallyandifsowithwhatsortsofeffects?Doesitmakea differencetotheoperationofsystemsinwhichitispresent,andif sowhyandhow? Thethreequestionsfocusrespectivelyondescribingthefeaturesof consciousness,explainingitsunderlyingbasisorcause,and explicatingitsroleorvalue.Thedivisionsamongthethreeareof coursesomewhatartificial,andinpracticetheanswersonegivesto eachwilldependinpartonwhatonesaysabouttheothers.Onecan not,forexample,adequatelyanswerthewhatquestionanddescribethe mainfeaturesofconsciousnesswithoutaddressingthewhyissueofits functionalrolewithinsystemswhoseoperationsitaffects.Norcould oneexplainhowtherelevantsortofconsciousnessmightarisefrom nonconsciousprocessesunlessonehadaclearaccountofjustwhat featureshadtobecausedorrealizedtocountasproducingit.Those caveatsnotwithstanding,thethree-waydivisionofquestionsprovidesa usefulstructureforarticulatingtheoverallexplanatoryprojectand forassessingtheadequacyofparticulartheoriesormodelsof consciousness. 4.Thedescriptivequestion:Whatarethefeaturesofconsciousness? TheWhatquestionasksustodescribeandmodelthe principalfeaturesofconsciousness,butjustwhichfeaturesare relevantwillvarywiththesortofconsciousnessweaimtocapture. Themainpropertiesofaccessconsciousnessmaybequiteunlikethose ofqualitativeorphenomenalconsciousness,andthoseofreflexive consciousnessornarrativeconsciousnessmaydifferfromboth.However, bybuildingupdetailedtheoriesofeachtype,wemayhopetofind importantlinksbetweenthemandperhapseventodiscoverthatthey coincideinatleastsomekeyrespects. 4.1First-personandthird-persondata Thegeneraldescriptiveprojectwillrequireavarietyof investigationalmethods(Flanagan1992).Thoughonemightnaively regardthefactsofconsciousnessastooself-evidenttorequireany systematicmethodsofgatheringdata,theepistemictaskisinreality farfromtrivial(Husserl1913). First-personintrospectiveaccessprovidesarichandessential sourceofinsightintoourconsciousmentallife,butitisneither sufficientinitselfnorevenespeciallyhelpfulunlessusedina trainedanddisciplinedway.Gatheringtheneededevidenceaboutthe structureofexperiencerequiresusbothtobecomephenomenologically sophisticatedself-observersandtocomplementourintrospective resultswithmanytypesofthird-persondataavailabletoexternal observers(Searle1992,Varela1995,Siewert1998) Asphenomenologistshaveknownformorethanacentury,discovering thestructureofconsciousexperiencedemandsarigorousinner-directed stancethatisquiteunlikeoureverydayformofself-awareness (Husserl1929,Merleau-Ponty1945).Skilledobservationoftheneeded sortrequirestraining,effortandtheabilitytoadoptalternative perspectivesonone'sexperience. Theneedforthird-personempiricaldatagatheredbyexternal observersisperhapsmostobviouswithregardtothemoreclearly functionaltypesofconsciousnesssuchasaccessconsciousness,butit isrequiredevenwithregardtophenomenalandqualitative consciousness.Forexample,deficitstudiesthatcorrelatevarious neuralandfunctionalsitesofdamagewithabnormalitiesofconscious experiencecanmakeusawareofaspectsofphenomenalstructurethat escapeournormalintrospectiveawareness.Assuchcasestudiesshow, thingscancomeapartinexperiencethatseeminseparablyunifiedor singularfromournormalfirst-personpointofview(Sacks1985, Shallice1988,Farah1995). Ortopickanotherexample,third-persondatacanmakeusawareof howourexperiencesofactingandourexperiencesofevent-timing affecteachotherinwaysthatwecouldneverdiscernthroughmere introspection(Libet1985,Wegner2002).Norarethefactsgatheredby thesethirdpersonmethodsmerelyaboutthecausesorbasesof consciousness;theyoftenconcerntheverystructureofphenomenal consciousnessitself.First-person,third-personandperhapseven second-person(Varela1995)interactivemethodswillallbeneededto collecttherequisiteevidence. Usingallthesesourcesofdata,wewillhopefullybeableto constructdetaileddescriptivemodelsofthevarioussortsof consciousness.Thoughthespecificfeaturesofmostimportancemayvary amongthedifferenttypes,ouroveralldescriptiveprojectwillneedto addressatleastthefollowingsevengeneralaspectsofconsciousness (sections4.2–4.7). 4.2Qualitativecharacter Qualitativecharacterisoftenequatedwithsocalled “rawfeels”andillustratedbytherednessoneexperiences whenonelooksatripetomatoesorthespecificsweetsavorone encounterswhenonetastesanequallyripepineapple(Locke1688).The relevantsortofqualitativecharacterisnotrestrictedtosensory states,butistypicallytakentobepresentasanaspectof experientialstatesingeneral,suchasexperiencedthoughtsordesires (Siewert1998). Theexistenceofsuchfeelsmayseemtosometomarkthethreshold forstatesorcreaturesthatarereallyconscious.Ifanorganism sensesandrespondsinaptwaystoitsworldbutlackssuchqualia, thenitmightcountasconsciousatbestinalooseandlessthan literalsense.Orsoatleastitwouldseemtothosewhotake qualitativeconsciousnessinthe“whatitislike”senseto bephilosophicallyandscientificallycentral(Nagel1974,Chalmers 1996). Qualiaproblemsinmanyforms—Cantherebeinvertedqualia? (Block1980a1980b,Shoemaker1981,1982)Arequaliaepiphenomenal? (Jackson1982,Chalmers1996)Howcouldneuralstatesgiveriseto qualia?(Levine1983,McGinn1991)—haveloomedlargeinthe recentpast.ButtheWhatquestionraisesamorebasicproblemof qualia:namelythatofgivingaclearandarticulateddescriptionof ourqualiaspaceandthestatusofspecificqualiawithinit. Absentsuchamodel,factualordescriptiveerrorsarealltoo likely.Forexample,claimsabouttheunintelligibilityofthelink betweenexperiencedredandanypossibleneuralsubstrateofsuchan experiencesometimestreattherelevantcolorqualeasasimpleand suigenerisproperty(Levine1983),butphenomenalrednessin factexistswithinacomplexcolorspacewithmultiplesystematic dimensionsandsimilarityrelations(Hardin1992).Understandingthe specificcolorqualerelativetothatlargerrelationalstructurenot onlygivesusabetterdescriptivegraspofitsqualitativenature,it mayalsoprovidesome“hooks”towhichonemightattach intelligiblepsycho-physicallinks. Colormaybetheexceptionintermsofourhavingaspecificand welldevelopedformalunderstandingoftherelevantqualitativespace, butitisnotlikelyanexceptionwithregardtotheimportanceofsuch spacestoourunderstandingofqualitativepropertiesingeneral(Clark 1993,P.M.Churchland1995).(Seetheentryon qualia.) 4.3Phenomenalstructure Phenomenalstructureshouldnotbeconflatedwith qualitativestructure,despitethesometimesinterchangeableuseof “qualia”and“phenomenalproperties”inthe literature.“Phenomenalorganization”coversallthe variouskindsoforderandstructurefoundwithinthedomainof experience,i.e.,withinthedomainoftheworldasitappears tous.Thereareobviouslyimportantlinksbetweenthephenomenaland thequalitative.Indeedqualiamightbebestunderstoodasproperties ofphenomenalorexperiencedobjects,butthereisinfactfarmoreto thephenomenalthanrawfeels.AsKant(1787),Husserl(1913),and generationsofphenomenologistshaveshown,thephenomenalstructureof experienceisrichlyintentionalandinvolvesnotonlysensoryideas andqualitiesbutcomplexrepresentationsoftime,space,cause,body, self,worldandtheorganizedstructureoflivedrealityinallits conceptualandnonconceptualforms. Sincemanynon-consciousstatesalsohaveintentionaland representationalaspects,itmaybebesttoconsiderphenomenal structureasinvolvingaspecialkindofintentionaland representationalorganizationandcontent,thekinddistinctively associatedwithconsciousness(Siewert1998).(Seetheentryon representationaltheoriesofconsciousness). AnsweringtheWhatquestionrequiresacarefulaccountofthe coherentanddenselyorganizedrepresentationalframeworkwithinwhich particularexperiencesareembedded.Sincemostofthatstructureis onlyimplicitintheorganizationofexperience,itcannotjustbe readoffbyintrospection.Articulatingthestructureofthephenomenal domaininaclearandintelligiblewayisalonganddifficultprocess ofinferenceandmodelbuilding(Husserl1929).Introspectioncanaid it,butalotoftheoryconstructionandingenuityarealsoneeded. Therehasbeenrecentphilosophicaldebateabouttherangeof propertiesthatarephenomenallypresentormanifestinconscious experience,inparticularwithrespecttocognitivestatessuchas believingorthinking.Somehavearguedforasocalled “thin”viewaccordingtowhichphenomenalpropertiesare limitedtoqualiarepresentingbasicsensoryproperties,suchas colors,shapes,tonesandfeels.Accordingtosuchtheorists,there isnodistinctive“what-it-is-likeness”involvedin believingthatParisisthecapitalofFranceorthat17isaprime number(Tye,Prinz2012).Someimagery,e.g.,oftheEiffelTower,may accompanyourhavingsuchathought,butthatisincidentaltoit andthecognitivestateitselfhasnophenomenalfeel.Onthethin view,thephenomenalaspectofperceptualstatesaswellislimitedto basicsensoryfeatures;whenoneseesanimageofWinstonChurchill, one'sperceptualphenomenologyislimitedonlytothespatialaspects ofhisface. Othersholdsa“thick”viewaccordingtowhichthe phenomenologyofperceptionincludesamuchwiderrangeoffeatures andcognitivestateshaveadistinctivephenomenologyaswell (Strawson2003,Pitt2004,Seigel2010).Onthethickview,the what-it-is-likenessofperceivinganimageofMarilynMonroeincludes one'srecognitionofherhistoryaspartofthefeltaspectofthe experience,andbeliefsandthoughtsaswellcanandtypicallydohave adistinctivenonsensoryphenomenology.Bothsidesofthedebateare wellrepresentedinthevolumeCognitivePhenomenology(Bayneand Montague2010). 4.4Subjectivity Subjectivityisanothernotionsometimesequatedwiththe qualitativeorthephenomenalaspectsofconsciousnessinthe literature,butagaintherearegoodreasontorecognizeit,atleast insomeofitsforms,asadistinctfeatureof consciousness—relatedtothequalitativeandthephenomenalbut differentfromeach.Inparticular,theepistemicformof subjectivityconcernsapparentlimitsontheknowabilityoreventhe understandabilityofvariousfactsaboutconsciousexperience(Nagel 1974,VanGulick1985,Lycan1996). OnThomasNagel's(1974)account,factsaboutwhatitisliketobe abataresubjectiveintherelevantsensebecausetheycanbefully understoodonlyfromthebat-typepointofview.Onlycreaturescapable ofhavingorundergoingsimilarsuchexperiencescanunderstandtheir what-it's-likenessintherequisiteempatheticsense.Factsabout consciousexperiencecanbeatbestincompletelyunderstoodfroman outsidethirdpersonpointofview,suchasthoseassociatedwith objectivephysicalscience.Asimilarviewaboutthelimitsof third-persontheoryseemstoliebehindclaimsregardingwhatFrank Jackson's(1982)hypotheticalMary,thesupercolorscientist,could notunderstandaboutexperiencingredbecauseofherownimpoverished historyofachromaticvisualexperience. Whetherfactsaboutexperienceareindeedepistemicallylimitedin thiswayisopentodebate(Lycan1996),buttheclaimthat understandingconsciousnessrequiresspecialformsofknowingand accessfromtheinsidepointofviewisintuitivelyplausibleandhasa longhistory(Locke1688).ThusanyadequateanswertotheWhat questionmustaddresstheepistemicstatusofconsciousness,bothour abilitiestounderstanditandtheirlimits(Papineau2002,Chalmers 2003).(Seetheentryon self-knowledge). 4.5Self-perspectivalorganization Theperspectivalstructureofconsciousnessisoneaspectofits overallphenomenalorganization,butitisimportantenoughtomerit discussioninitsownright.Insofarasthekeyperspectiveisthatof theconsciousself,thespecificfeaturemightbecalled self-perspectuality.Consciousexperiencesdonotexistas isolatedmentalatoms,butasmodesorstatesofaconsciousselfor subject(Descartes1644,Searle1992,thoughpaceHume1739).Avisual experienceofabluesphereisalwaysamatteroftherebeingsomeself orsubjectwhoisappearedtointhatway.Asharpandstabbingpainis alwaysapainfeltorexperiencedbysomeconscioussubject.Theself neednotappearasanexplicitelementinourexperiences,butasKant (1787)notedthe“Ithink”mustatleastpotentially accompanyeachofthem. Theselfmightbetakenastheperspectivalpointfromwhichthe worldofobjectsispresenttoexperience(Wittgenstein1921).It providesnotonlyaspatialandtemporalperspectiveforourexperience oftheworldbutoneofmeaningandintelligibilityaswell.The intentionalcoherenceoftheexperientialdomainreliesuponthedual interdependencebetweenselfandworld:theselfasperspectivefrom whichobjectsareknownandtheworldastheintegratedstructureof objectsandeventswhosepossibilitiesofbeingexperiencedimplicitly definethenatureandlocationoftheself(Kant1787,Husserl 1929). Consciousorganismsobviouslydifferintheextenttowhichthey constituteaunifiedandcoherentself,andtheylikelydiffer accordinglyinthesortordegreeofperspectivalfocustheyembodyin theirrespectiveformsofexperience(Lorenz1977).Consciousnessmay notrequireadistinctorsubstantialselfofthetraditionalCartesian sort,butatleastsomedegreeofperspectivallyself-likeorganization seemsessentialfortheexistenceofanythingthatmightcountas consciousexperience.Experiencesseemnomoreabletoexistwithouta selforsubjecttoundergothemthancouldoceanwavesexistwithout theseathroughwhichtheymove.TheDescriptivequestionthusrequires someaccountoftheself-perspectivalaspectofexperienceandthe self-likeorganizationofconsciousmindsonwhichitdepends,evenif therelevantaccounttreatstheselfinarelativelydeflationaryand virtualway(Dennett1991,1992). 4.6Unity Unityiscloselylinkedwiththeself-perspective,butit meritsspecificmentiononitsownasakeyaspectoftheorganization ofconsciousness.Conscioussystemsandconsciousmentalstatesboth involvemanydiverseformsofunity.Somearecausalunitiesassociated withtheintegrationofactionandcontrolintoaunifiedfocusof agency.Othersaremorerepresentationalandintentionalformsofunity involvingtheintegrationofdiverseitemsofcontentatmanyscales andlevelsofbinding(Cleeremans2003). Somesuchintegrationsarerelativelylocalaswhendiversefeatures detectedwithinasinglesensemodalityarecombinedintoa representationofexternalobjectsbearingthosefeatures,e.g.when onehasaconsciousvisualexperienceofamovingredsoupcanpassing aboveagreenstripednapkin(TriesmanandGelade1980). Otherformsofintentionalunityencompassafarwiderrangeof contents.Thecontentofone'spresentexperienceoftheroominwhich onesitsdependsinpartuponitslocationwithinafarlarger structureassociatedwithone'sawarenessofone'sexistenceasan ongoingtemporallyextendedobserverwithinaworldofspatially connectedindependentlyexistingobjects(Kant1787,Husserl1913).The individualexperiencecanhavethecontentthatitdoesonlybecauseit resideswithinthatlargerunifiedstructureofrepresentation.(See theentryon unityofconsciousness.) Particularattentionhasbeenpaidrecentlytothenotionof phenomenalunity(Bayne2010)anditsrelationtootherformsof consciousunitysuchasthoseinvolvingrepresentational,functional orneuralintegration.Somehavearguedthatphenomenalunitycanbe reducedtorepresentationalunity(Tye2005)whileothershavedenied thepossibilityofanysuchreduction(Bayne2010). 4.7Intentionalityandtransparency Consciousmentalstatesaretypicallyregardedashavinga representationalorintentionalaspectinsofarastheyareabout things,refertothingsorhavesatisfactionconditions.One's consciousvisualexperiencecorrectlyrepresentstheworldif therearelilacsinawhitevaseonthetable(paceTravis2004),one's consciousmemoryisoftheattackontheWorldTradeCenter, andone'sconsciousdesireisforaglassofcoldwater. However,nonconsciousstatescanalsoexhibitintentionalityinsuch ways,anditisimportanttounderstandthewaysinwhichthe representationalaspectsofconsciousstatesresembleanddifferfrom thoseofnonconsciousstates(Carruthers2000).Searle(1990)offersa contraryviewaccordingtowhichonlyconsciousstatesanddispositions tohaveconsciousstatescanbegenuinelyintentional,butmost theoristsregardintentionalityasextendingwidelyintothe unconsciousdomain.(Seetheentryon consciousnessandintentionality.) Onepotentiallyimportantdimensionofdifferenceconcernssocalled transparency,whichisanimportantfeatureofconsciousness intwointerrelatedmetaphoricsenses,eachofwhichhasan intentional,anexperientialandafunctionalaspect. Consciousperceptualexperienceisoftensaidtobetransparent,or inG.E.Moore's(1922)phrase“diaphanous”.We transparently“lookthrough”oursensoryexperienceinso farasweseemdirectlyawareofexternalobjectsandeventspresentto usratherthanbeingawareofanypropertiesofexperiencebywhichit presentsorrepresentssuchobjectstous.WhenIlookoutatthe wind-blownmeadow,itistheundulatinggreengrassofwhichIamaware notofanygreenpropertyofmyvisualexperience.(Seetheentryon representationaltheoriesofconsciousness.) Moorehimselfbelievedwecouldbecomeawareofthoselatter qualitieswitheffortandredirectionofattention,thoughsome contemporarytransparencyadvocatesdenyit(Harman1990,Tye 1995,Kind2003). Consciousthoughtsandexperiencesarealsotransparentina semanticsenseinthattheirmeaningsseemimmediatelyknowntousin theveryactofthinkingthem(VanGulick1992).Inthatsensewemight besaidto‘thinkrightthrough’themtowhattheymeanor represent.Transparencyinthissemanticsensemaycorrespondatleast partlywithwhatJohnSearlecallsthe“intrinsic intentionality”ofconsciousness(Searle1992). Ourconsciousmentalstatesseemtohavetheirmeanings intrinsicallyorfromtheinsidejustbybeingwhattheyarein themselves,bycontrastwithmanyexternalisttheoriesofmental contentthatgroundmeaningincausal,counterfactualorinformational relationsbetweenbearersofintentionalityandtheirsemanticor referentialobjects. Theviewofconsciouscontentasintrinsicallydeterminedand internallyself-evidentissometimessupportedbyappealstobrainin thevatintuitions,whichmakeitseemthattheenvattedbrain's consciousmentalstateswouldkeepalltheirnormalintentional contentsdespitethelossofalltheirnormalcausalandinformational linkstotheworld(HorganandTienson2002).Thereiscontinued controversyaboutsuchcasesandaboutcompetinginternalist(Searle 1992)andexternalistviews(Dretske1995)ofconscious intentionality. Thoughsemantictransparencyandintrinsicintentionalityhavesome affinities,theyshouldnotbesimplyequated,sinceitmaybepossible toaccommodatetheformernotionwithinamoreexternalistaccountof contentandmeaning.Bothsemanticandsensorytransparencyobviously concerntherepresentationalorintentionalaspectsofconsciousness, buttheyarealsoexperientialaspectsofourconsciouslife.Theyare partofwhatit'slikeorhowitfeelsphenomenallytobeconscious. Theyalsobothhavefunctionalaspects,insofarasconsciousexperiences interactwitheachotherinrichlycontent-appropriatewaysthat manifestourtransparentunderstandingoftheircontents. 4.8Dynamicflow Thedynamicsofconsciousnessareevidentinthecoherent orderofitseverchangingprocessofflowandself-transformation, whatWilliamJames(1890)calledthe“streamof consciousness.”Sometemporalsequencesofexperienceare generatedbypurelyinternalfactorsaswhenonethinksthrougha puzzle,andothersdependinpartuponexternalcausesaswhenone chasesaflyball,buteventhelattersequencesareshapedinlarge partbyhowconsciousnesstransformsitself. Whetherpartlyinresponsetoouterinfluencesorentirelyfrom within,eachmomenttomomentsequenceofexperiencegrowscoherently outofthosethatprecededit,constrainedandenabledbytheglobal structureoflinksandlimitsembodiedinitsunderlyingprior organization(Husserl1913).Inthatrespect,consciousnessisan autopoieticsystem,i.e.,aself-creatingandself-organizingsystem (VarelaandMaturana1980). AsaconsciousmentalagentIcandomanythingssuchasscanmy room,scanamentalimageofit,reviewinmemorythecoursesofa recentrestaurantmealalongwithmanyofitstastesandscents,reason mywaythroughacomplexproblem,orplanagroceryshoppingtripand executethatplanwhenIarriveatthemarket.Theseareallroutine andcommonactivities,buteachinvolvesthedirectedgenerationof experiencesinwaysthatmanifestanimplicitpracticalunderstanding oftheirintentionalpropertiesandinterconnectedcontents(VanGulick 2000). Consciousnessisadynamicprocess,andthusanadequatedescriptive answertotheWhatquestionmustdealwithmorethanjustitsstaticor momentaryproperties.Inparticular,itmustgivesomeaccountofthe temporaldynamicsofconsciousnessandthewaysinwhichits self-transformingflowreflectsbothitsintentionalcoherenceandthe semanticself-understandingembodiedintheorganizedcontrolsthrough whichconsciousmindscontinuallyremakethemselvesasautopoietic systemsengagedwiththeirworlds. Acomprehensivedescriptiveaccountofconsciousnesswouldneedto dealwithmorethanjustthesesevenfeatures,buthavingaclear accountofeachofthemwouldtakeusalongwaytowardansweringthe “Whatisconsciousness?”question. 5.Theexplanatoryquestion:Howcanconsciousnessexist? TheHowquestionfocusesonexplanationratherthan description.Itasksustoexplainthebasicstatusofconsciousness anditsplaceinnature.Isitafundamentalfeatureofrealityinits ownright,ordoesitsexistencedependuponothernonconsciousitems, betheyphysical,biological,neuralorcomputational?Andifthe latter,canweexplainorunderstandhowtherelevantnonconscious itemscouldcauseorrealizeconsciousness?Putsimply,canweexplain howtomakesomethingconsciousoutofthingsthatarenot conscious? 5.1Diversityofexplanatoryprojects TheHowquestionisnotasinglequestion,butratherageneral familyofmorespecificquestions(VanGulick1995).Theyallconcern thepossibilityofexplainingsomesortoraspectofconsciousness,but theyvaryintheirparticularexplananda,therestrictionsontheir explanans,andtheircriteriaforsuccessfulexplanation.Forexample, onemightaskwhetherwecanexplainaccessconsciousness computationallybymimickingtherequisiteaccessrelationsina computationalmodel.Oronemightbeconcernedinsteadwithwhetherthe phenomenalandqualitativepropertiesofaconsciouscreature'smind canbeapriorideducedfromadescriptionoftheneural propertiesofitsbrainprocesses.BothareversionsoftheHow question,buttheyaskabouttheprospectsofverydifferent explanatoryprojects,andthusmaydifferintheiranswers(Lycan 1996).Itwouldbeimpractical,ifnotimpossible,tocatalogallthe possibleversionsoftheHowquestion,butsomeofthemainoptionscanbe listed. Explananda.Possibleexplanandawouldincludethevarious sortsofstateandcreatureconsciousnessdistinguishedabove,aswell asthesevenfeaturesofconsciousnesslistedinresponsetotheWhat question.Thosetwotypesofexplanandaoverlapandintersect.Wemight forexampleaimtoexplainthedynamicaspecteitherofphenomenalor ofaccessconsciousness.Orwecouldtrytoexplainthesubjectivityof eitherqualitativeormeta-mentalconsciousness.Noteveryfeature appliestoeverysortofconsciousness,butallapplytoseveral.How oneexplainsagivenfeatureinrelationtoonesortofconsciousness maynotcorrespondwithwhatisneededtoexplainitrelativeto another. Explanans.Therangeofpossibleexplanansisalsodiverse. Inperhapsitsbroadestform,theHowquestionaskshowconsciousness oftherelevantsortcouldbecausedorrealizedbynonconsciousitems, butwecangenerateawealthofmorespecificquestionsbyfurther restrictingtherangeoftherelevantexplanans.Onemightseekto explainhowagivenfeatureofconsciousnessiscausedorrealizedby underlyingneuralprocesses,biologicalstructures, physicalmechanisms,functionalor teleofunctionalrelations,computational organization,orevenbynonconsciousmentalstates.The prospectsforexplanatorysuccesswillvaryaccordingly.Ingeneralthe morelimitedandelementarytherangeoftheexplanans,themore difficulttheproblemofexplaininghowcoulditsufficetoproduce consciousness(VanGulick1995). Criteriaofexplanation.Thethirdkeyparameterishowone definesthecriterionforasuccessfulexplanation.Onemightrequire thattheexplanandumbeapriorideduciblefromtheexplanans, althoughitiscontroversialwhetherthisiseitheranecessaryora sufficientcriterionforexplainingconsciousness(Jackson1993).Its sufficiencywilldependinpartonthenatureofthepremisesfrom whichthedeductionproceeds.Asamatteroflogic,onewillneedsome bridgeprinciplestoconnectpropositionsorsentencesabout consciousnesswiththosethatdonotmentionit.Ifone'spremises concernphysicalorneuralfacts,thenonewillneedsomebridge principlesorlinksthatconnectsuchfactswithfactsabout consciousness(Kim1998).Brutelinks,whethernomicormerelywell confirmedcorrelations,couldprovidealogicallysufficientbridgeto inferconclusionsaboutconsciousness.Buttheywouldprobablynot allowustoseehoworwhythoseconnectionshold,andthustheywould fallshortoffullyexplaininghowconsciousnessexists(Levine1983, 1993,McGinn1991). Onecouldlegitimatelyaskformore,inparticularforsomeaccount thatmadeintelligiblewhythoselinksholdandperhapswhytheycould notfailtodoso.Afamiliartwo-stagemodelforexplaining macro-propertiesintermsofmicro-substratesisofteninvoked.Inthe firststep,oneanalyzesthemacro-propertyintermsoffunctional conditions,andtheninthesecondstageoneshowsthatthe micro-structuresobeyingthelawsoftheirownlevelnomicallysuffice toguaranteethesatisfactionoftherelevantfunctionalconditions (Armstrong1968,Lewis1972). Themicro-propertiesofcollectionsofH2Omoleculesat20°C sufficetosatisfytheconditionsfortheliquidityofthewaterthey compose.Moreover,themodelmakesintelligiblehowtheliquidityis producedbythemicro-properties.Asatisfactoryexplanationofhow consciousnessisproducedmightseemtorequireasimilartwostage story.Withoutit,evenapriorideducibilitymightseem explanatorilylessthansufficient,thoughtheneedforsuchastory remainsamatterofcontroversy(BlockandStalnaker1999,Chalmers andJackson2001). 5.2Theexplanatorygap Ourcurrentinabilitytosupplyasuitablyintelligiblelinkis sometimesdescribed,followingJosephLevine(1983),astheexistence ofanexplanatorygap,andasindicatingourincomplete understandingofhowconsciousnessmightdependuponanonconscious substrate,especiallyaphysicalsubstrate.Thebasicgapclaimadmits ofmanyvariationsingeneralityandthusinstrength. Inperhapsitsweakestform,itassertsapracticallimit onourpresentexplanatoryabilities;givenourcurrent theoriesandmodelswecannotnowarticulateanintelligiblelink.A strongerversionmakesaninprincipleclaimaboutour humancapacitiesandthusassertsthatgivenourhuman cognitivelimitswewillneverbeabletobridgethegap.Tous,or creaturescognitivelylikeus,itmustremainaresidualmystery (McGinn1991).ColinMcGinn(1995)hasarguedthatgiventheinherently spatialnatureofbothourhumanperceptualconceptsandthescientific conceptswederivefromthem,wehumansarenotconceptuallysuitedfor understandingthenatureofthepsychophysicallink.Factsaboutthat linkareascognitivelyclosedtousasarefactsaboutmultiplication orsquarerootstoarmadillos.Theydonotfallwithinourconceptual andcognitiverepertoire.Anevenstrongerversionofthegapclaim removestherestrictiontoourcognitivenatureanddeniesin principlethatthegapcanbeclosedbyanycognitive agents. Thosewhoassertgapclaimsdisagreeamongthemselvesaboutwhat metaphysicalconclusions,ifany,followfromoursupposedepistemic limits.Levinehimselfhasbeenreluctanttodrawanyanti-physicalist ontologicalconclusions(Levine1993,2001).Ontheotherhandsome neodualistshavetriedtousetheexistenceofthegaptorefute physicalism(Foster1996,Chalmers1996).Thestrongerone's epistemologicalpremise,thebetterthehopeofderivingametaphysical conclusion.Thusunsurprisingly,dualistconclusionsareoften supportedbyappealstothesupposedimpossibilityin principleofclosingthegap. Ifonecouldseeonapriorigroundsthatthereisnoway inwhichconsciousnesscouldbeintelligiblyexplainedasarisingfrom thephysical,itwouldnotbeabigsteptoconcludingthatitinfact doesnotdoso(Chalmers1996).However,theverystrengthofsuchan epistemologicalclaimmakesitdifficulttoassumewithbeggingthe metaphysicalresultinquestion.Thusthosewhowishtouseastrong inprinciplegapclaimtorefutephysicalismmustfind independentgroundstosupportit.Somehaveappealedtoconceivability argumentsforsupport,suchastheallegedconceivabilityofzombies molecularlyidenticalwithconscioushumansbutdevoidofall phenomenalconsciousness(Campbell1970,Kirk1974,Chalmers1996). Othersupportingargumentsinvokethesupposednon-functionalnatureof consciousnessandthusitsallegedresistancetothestandard scientificmethodofexplainingcomplexproperties(e.g.,genetic dominance)intermsofphysicallyrealizedfunctionalconditions(Block 1980a,Chalmers1996).Suchargumentsavoidbeggingthe anti-physicalistquestion,buttheythemselvesrelyuponclaimsand intuitionsthatarecontroversialandnotcompletelyindependentof one'sbasicviewaboutphysicalism.Discussiononthetopicremains activeandongoing. Ourpresentinabilitytoseeanywayofclosingthegapmayexert somepullonourintuitions,butitmaysimplyreflectthelimitsof ourcurrenttheorizingratherthananunbridgeableinprinciplebarrier (Dennett1991).Moreover,somephysicalistshavearguedthat explanatorygapsaretobeexpectedandareevenentailedbyplausible versionsofontologicalphysicalism,onesthattreathumanagentsas physicallyrealizedcognitivesystemswithinherentlimitsthatderive fromtheirevolutionaryoriginandsituatedcontextualmodeof understanding(VanGulick1985,2003;McGinn1991,Papineau1995, 2002).Onthisview,ratherthanrefutingphysicalism,theexistenceof explanatorygapsmayconfirmit.Discussionanddisagreementonthese topicsremainsactiveandongoing. 5.3Reductiveandnon-reductiveexplanation Astheneedforintelligiblelinkagehasshown,apriori deducibilityisnotinitselfobviouslysufficientforsuccessful explanation(Kim1980),norisitclearlynecessary.Someweaker logicallinkmightsufficeinmanyexplanatorycontexts.Wecan sometimestellenoughofastoryabouthowfactsofonesortdepend uponthoseofanothertosatisfyourselvesthatthelatterdoinfact causeorrealizetheformerevenifwecannotstrictlydeduceallthe formerfactsfromthelatter. Strictintertheoreticaldeductionwastakenasthereductivenormby thelogicalempiricistaccountoftheunityofscience(Putnamand Oppenheim1958),butinmorerecentdecadesaloosernonreductive pictureofrelationsamongthevariousscienceshasgainedfavor.In particular,nonreductivematerialistshavearguedforthesocalled “autonomyofthespecialsciences”(Fodor1974)andforthe viewthatunderstandingthenaturalworldrequiresustousea diversityofconceptualandrepresentationalsystemsthatmaynotbe strictlyintertranslatableorcapableofbeingputintothetight correspondencerequiredbytheolderdeductiveparadigmofinterlevel relations(Putnam1975). Economicsisoftencitedasanexample(Fodor1974,Searle1992). Economicfactsmayberealizedbyunderlyingphysicalprocesses,butno oneseriouslydemandsthatwebeabletodeducetherelevanteconomic factsfromdetaileddescriptionsoftheirunderlyingphysicalbasesor thatwebeabletoputtheconceptsandvocabularyofeconomicsin tightcorrespondencewiththoseofthephysicalsciences. Nonethelessourdeductiveinabilityisnotseenascausefor ontologicalmisgivings;thereisno“money-matter”problem. Allthatwerequireissomegeneralandlessthandeductive understandingofhoweconomicpropertiesandrelationsmightbe underlainbyphysicalones.Thusonemightoptforasimilarcriterion forinterpretingtheHowquestionandforwhatcountsasexplaininghow consciousnessmightbecausedorrealizedbynonconsciousitems. However,somecritics,suchasKim(1987),havechallengedthe coherenceofanyviewthataimstobebothnon-reductiveand physicalist,thoughsupportersofsuchviewshaverepliedinturn(Van Gulick1993). Othershavearguedthatconsciousnessisespeciallyresistantto explanationinphysicaltermsbecauseoftheinherentdifferences betweenoursubjectiveandobjectivemodesofunderstanding.Thomas Nagelfamouslyargued(1974)thatthereareunavoidablelimitsplacedonour abilitytounderstandthephenomenologyofbatexperiencebyour inabilitytoempatheticallytakeonanexperientialperspectivelike thatwhichcharacterizesthebat'secho-locatoryauditoryexperienceof itsworld.Givenourinabilitytoundergosimilarexperience,wecan haveatbestpartialunderstandingofthenatureofsuchexperience.No amountofknowledgegleanedfromtheexternalobjectivethird-person perspectiveofthenaturalscienceswillsupposedlysufficetoallowus tounderstandwhatthebatcanunderstandofitsownexperiencefrom itsinternalfirst-personsubjectivepointofview. 5.4Prospectsofexplanatorysuccess TheHowquestionthussubdividesintoadiversefamilyofmore specificquestionsdependinguponthespecificsortorfeatureof consciousnessoneaimstoexplain,thespecificrestrictionsoneplaces ontherangeoftheexplanansandthecriteriononeusestodefine explanatorysuccess.Someoftheresultingvariantsseemeasierto answerthanothers.Progressmayseemlikelyonsomeofthesocalled “easyproblems”ofconsciousness,suchasexplainingthe dynamicsofaccessconsciousnessintermsofthefunctionalor computationalorganizationofthebrain(Baars1988).Othersmayseem lesstractable,especiallytheso-called“hardproblem” (Chalmers1995)whichismoreorlessthatofgivinganintelligible accountthatletsusseeinanintuitivelysatisfyingwayhow phenomenalor“whatit'slike”consciousnessmightarise fromphysicalorneuralprocessesinthebrain. PositiveanswerstosomeversionsoftheHowquestionsseemnearat hand,butothersappeartoremaindeeplybaffling.Norshouldweassume thateveryversionhasapositiveanswer.Ifdualismistrue,then consciousnessinatleastsomeofitstypesmaybebasicand fundamental.Ifso,wewillnotbeabletoexplainhowitarisesfrom nonconsciousitemssinceitsimplydoesnotdoso. One'sviewoftheprospectsforexplainingconsciousnesswill typicallydependuponone'sperspective.Optimisticphysicalistswill likelyseecurrentexplanatorylapsesasmerelythereflectionofthe earlystageofinquiryandsuretoberemediedinthenottoodistant future(Dennett1991,Searle1992,P.M.Churchland1995).Todualists, thosesameimpasseswillsignifythebankruptcyofthephysicalist programandtheneedtorecognizeconsciousnessasafundamental constituentofrealityinitsownright(Robinson1982,Foster1989, 1996,Chalmers1996).Whatoneseesdependsinpartonwhereone stands,andtheongoingprojectofexplainingconsciousnesswillbe accompaniedbycontinuingdebateaboutitsstatusandprospectsfor success. 6.Thefunctionalquestion:Whydoesconsciousnessexist? ThefunctionalorWhyquestionasksaboutthe valueorroleorconsciousnessandthusindirectly aboutitsorigin.Doesithaveafunction,andifsowhat isit?Doesitmakeadifferencetotheoperationofsystemsinwhich itispresent,andifsowhyandhow?Ifconsciousnessexistsasa complexfeatureofbiologicalsystems,thenitsadaptivevalueis likelyrelevanttoexplainingitsevolutionaryorigin,thoughofcourse itspresentfunction,ifithasone,neednotbethesameasthatit mayhavehadwhenitfirstarose.Adaptivefunctionsoftenchangeover biologicaltime.Questionsaboutthevalueofconsciousnessalsohavea moraldimensioninatleasttwoways.Weareinclinedto regardanorganism'smoralstatusasatleastpartlydeterminedbythe natureandextenttowhichitisconscious,andconsciousstates, especiallyconsciousaffectivestatessuchaspleasuresandpains,play amajorroleinmanyoftheaccountsofvaluethatunderliemoral theory(Singer1975). AswiththeWhatandHowquestions,theWhyquestionposesageneral problemthatsubdividesintoadiversityofmorespecificinquiries.In sofarasthevarioussortsofconsciousness,e.g.,access,phenomenal, meta-mental,aredistinctandseparable—whichremainsanopen question—theylikelyalsodifferintheirspecificrolesand values.ThustheWhyquestionmaywellnothaveasingleoruniform answer. 6.1Causalstatusofconsciousness PerhapsthemostbasicissueposedbyanyversionoftheWhy questioniswhetherornotconsciousnessoftherelevantsorthasany causalimpactatall.Ifithasnoeffectsandmakesnocausal differencewhatsoever,thenitwouldseemunabletoplayany significantroleinthesystemsororganismsinwhichitispresent, thusundercuttingattheoutsetmostinquiriesaboutitspossible value.Norcanthethreatofepiphenomenalirrelevancebesimply dismissedasanobviousnon-option,sinceatleastsomeformsof consciousnesshavebeenseriouslyallegedintherecentliteratureto lackcausalstatus.(Seetheentryon epiphenomenalism.) Suchworrieshavebeenraisedespeciallywithregardtoqualiaand qualitativeconsciousness(Huxley1874,Jackson1982,Chalmers1996), butchallengeshavealsobeenleveledagainstthecausalstatusof othersortsincludingmeta-mentalconsciousness(Velmans1991). Bothmetaphysicalandempiricalargumentshavebeengiveninsupport ofsuchclaims.Amongtheformerarethosethatappealtointuitions abouttheconceivabilityandlogicalpossibilityofzombies,i.e.,of beingswhosebehavior,functionalorganization,andphysicalstructure downtothemolecularlevelareidenticaltothoseofnormalhuman agentsbutwholackanyqualiaorqualitativeconsciousness.Some(Kirk 1970,Chalmers1996)assertsuchbeingsarepossibleinworldsthat shareallourphysicallaws,butothersdenyit(Dennett1991,Levine 2001).Iftheyarepossibleinsuchworlds,thenitwouldseemto followthateveninourworld,qualiadonotaffectthecourseof physicaleventsincludingthosethatconstituteourhumanbehaviors.If thoseeventsunfoldinthesamewaywhetherornotqualiaarepresent, thenqualiaappeartobeinertorepiphenomenalatleastwithrespect toeventsinthephysicalworld.However,suchargumentsandthezombie intuitionsonwhichtheyrelyarecontroversialandtheirsoundness remainsindispute(Searle1992,Yablo1998,Balog1999). Argumentsofafarmoreempiricalsorthavechallengedthecausal statusofmeta-mentalconsciousness,atleastinsofarasitspresence canbemeasuredbytheabilitytoreportonone'smentalstate. Scientificevidenceisclaimedtoshowthatconsciousnessofthatsort isneithernecessaryforanytypeofmentalabilitynordoesitoccur earlyenoughtoactasacauseoftheactsorprocessestypically thoughttobeitseffects(Velmans1991).Accordingtothosewhomake sucharguments,thesortsofmentalabilitiesthataretypically thoughttorequireconsciousnesscanallberealizedunconsciouslyin theabsenceofthesupposedlyrequiredself-awareness. Moreover,evenwhenconsciousself-awarenessispresent,it allegedlyoccurstoolatetobethecauseoftherelevantactions ratherthantheirresultoratbestajointeffectofsomesharedprior cause(Libet1985).Self-awarenessormeta-mentalconsciousness accordingtotheseargumentsturnsouttobeapsychological after-effectratherthananinitiatingcause,morelikeapost factoprintoutortheresultdisplayedonone'scomputerscreen thanliketheactualprocessoroperationsthatproduceboththe computer'sresponseanditsdisplay. Onceagaintheargumentsarecontroversial,andboththesupposed dataandtheirinterpretationaresubjectsoflivelydisagreement(see Flanagan1992,andcommentariesaccompanyingVelmans1991).Thoughthe empiricalarguments,likethezombieclaims,requireonetoconsider seriouslywhethersomeformsofconsciousnessmaybelesscausally potentthanistypicallyassumed,manytheoristsregardtheempirical dataasnorealthreattothecausalstatusofconsciousness. Iftheepiphenomenalistsarewrongandconsciousness,initsvarious forms,isindeedcausal,whatsortsofeffectsdoesithaveandwhat differencesdoesitmake?Howdomentalprocessesthatinvolvethe relevantsortofconsciousnessdifferformthosethatlackit?What function(s)mightconsciousnessplay?Thefollowingsixsections (6.2–6.7)discusssomeofthemorecommonlygiven answers.Thoughthevariousfunctionsoverlaptosomedegree,eachis distinct,andtheydifferaswellinthesortsofconsciousnesswith whicheachismostaptlylinked. 6.2Flexiblecontrol Increasedflexibilityandsophisticationofcontrol. Consciousmentalprocessesappeartoprovidehighlyflexibleand adaptiveformsofcontrol.Thoughunconsciousautomaticprocessescan beextremelyefficientandrapid,theytypicallyoperateinwaysthat aremorefixedandpredeterminedthanthosewhichinvolveconscious self-awareness(Anderson1983).Consciousawarenessisthusofmost importancewhenoneisdealingwithnovelsituationsandpreviously unencounteredproblemsordemands(Penfield1975,Armstrong1981). Standardaccountsofskillacquisitionstresstheimportanceof consciousawarenessduringtheinitiallearningphase,whichgradually giveswaytomoreautomaticprocessesofthesortthatrequirelittle attentionorconsciousoversight(SchneiderandShiffrin1977). Consciousprocessingallowsfortheconstructionorcompilationof specificallytailoredroutinesoutofelementaryunitsaswellasfor thedeliberatecontroloftheirexecution. Thereisafamiliartradeoffbetweenflexibilityandspeed; controlledconsciousprocessespurchasetheircustomizedversatilityat thepriceofbeingslowandeffortfulincontrasttothefluidrapidity ofautomaticunconsciousmentaloperations(Anderson1983).The relevantincreasesinflexibilitywouldseemmostcloselyconnected withthemeta-mentalorhigher-orderformofconsciousnessinsofaras theenhancedabilitytocontrolprocessesdependsupongreater self-awareness.However,flexibilityandsophisticatedmodesofcontrol maybeassociatedaswellwiththephenomenalandaccessformsof consciousness. 6.3Socialcoordination Enhancedcapacityforsocialcoordination.Consciousnessof themeta-mentalsortmaywellinvolvenotonlyanincreasein self-awarenessbutalsoanenhancedunderstandingofthementalstates ofothermindedcreatures,especiallythoseofothermembersofone's socialgroup(Humphreys1982).Creaturesthatareconsciousinthe relevantmeta-mentalsensenotonlyhavebeliefs,motives,perceptions andintentionsbutunderstandwhatitistohavesuchstatesandare awareofboththemselvesandothersashavingthem. Thisincreaseinmutuallysharedknowledgeofeachother'sminds, enablestherelevantorganismstointeract,cooperateandcommunicate inmoreadvancedandadaptiveways.Althoughmeta-mentalconsciousness isthesortmostobviouslylinkedtosuchasociallycoordinativerole, narrativeconsciousnessofthekindassociatedwiththestreamof consciousnessisalsoclearlyrelevantinsofarasitinvolvesthe applicationtoone'sowncaseoftheinterpretativeabilitiesthat deriveinpartfromtheirsocialapplication(Ryle1949,Dennett1978, 1992). 6.4Integratedrepresentation Moreunifiedanddenselyintegratedrepresentationof reality.Consciousexperiencepresentsuswithaworldofobjects independentlyexistinginspaceandtime.Thoseobjectsaretypically presenttousinamulti-modalfashionthatinvolvestheintegrationof informationfromvarioussensorychannelsaswellasfrombackground knowledgeandmemory.Consciousexperiencepresentsusnotwith isolatedpropertiesorfeaturesbutwithobjectsandeventssituatedin anongoingindependentworld,anditdoessobyembodyinginits experientialorganizationanddynamicsthedensenetworkofrelations andinterconnectionsthatcollectivelyconstitutethemeaningful structureofaworldofobjects(Kant1787,Husserl1913,Campbell 1997). Ofcourse,notallsensoryinformationneedbeexperiencedtohave anadaptiveeffectonbehavior.Adaptivenon-experientialsensory-motor linkscanbefoundbothinsimpleorganisms,aswellasinsomeofthe moredirectandreflexiveprocessesofhigherorganisms.Butwhen experienceispresent,itprovidesamoreunifiedandintegrated representationofreality,onethattypicallyallowsformore open-endedavenuesofresponse(Lorenz1977).Considerforexamplethe representationofspaceinanorganismwhosesensoryinputchannelsare simplylinkedtomovementortotheorientationofafewfixed mechanismssuchasthoseforfeedingorgrabbingprey,andcompareit withthatinanorganismcapableofusingitsspatialinformationfor flexiblenavigationofitsenvironmentandforwhateverotherspatially relevantaimsorgoalsitmayhave,aswhenapersonvisuallyscansher officeorherkitchen(Gallistel1990). Itisrepresentationofthislattersortthatistypicallymade availablebytheintegratedmodeofpresentationassociatedwith consciousexperience.Theunityofexperiencedspaceisjustone exampleofthesortofintegrationassociatedwithourconscious awarenessofanobjectiveworld.(Seetheentryon unityofconsciousness.) Thisintegrativeroleorvalueismostdirectlyassociatedwithaccess consciousness,butalsoclearlywiththelargerphenomenaland intentionalstructureofexperience.Itisrelevanteventothe qualitativeaspectofconsciousnessinsofarasqualiaplayan importantroleinourexperienceofunifiedobjectsinaunifiedspace orscene.Itisintimatelytiedaswelltothetransparencyof experiencedescribedinresponsetotheWhatquestion,especiallyto semantictransparency(VanGulick1993).Integrationofinformation playsamajorroleinseveralcurrentneuro-cognitivetheoriesof consciousnessespeciallyGlobalWorkspacetheories(seesection9.5) andGiulioTononi'sIntegratedInformationtheory.(section9.6 below). 6.5Informationalaccess Moreglobalinformationalaccess.Theinformationcarried inconsciousmentalstatesistypicallyavailableforusebya diversityofmentalsubsystemsandforapplicationtoawiderangeof potentialsituationsandactions(Baars1988).Nonconsciousinformation ismorelikelytobeencapsulatedwithinparticularmentalmodulesand availableforuseonlywithrespecttotheapplicationsdirectly connectedtothatsubsystem'soperation(Fodor1983).Making informationconscioustypicallywidensthesphereofitsinfluenceand therangeofwaysitwhichitcanbeusedtoadaptivelyguideorshape bothinnerandouterbehavior.Astate'sbeingconsciousmaybeinpart amatterofwhatDennettcalls“cerebralcelebrity”,i.e., ofitsabilitytohaveacontent-appropriateimpactonothermental states. Thisparticularroleismostdirectlyanddefinitionallytiedtothe notionofaccessconsciousness(Block1995),butmeta-mental consciousnessaswellasthephenomenalandqualitativeformsallseem plausiblylinkedtosuchincreasesintheavailabilityofinformation (Armstrong1981,Tye1985).Diversecognitiveandneuro-cognitive theoriesincorporateaccessasacentralfeatureofconsciousnessand consciousprocessing.GlobalWorkspacetheories,Prinz'sAttendend IntermediateRepresentation(AIR)(Prinz2012)andTononi'sIntegrated InformationTheory(IIT)alldistinguishconsciousstatesand processesatleastpartlyintermsofenhancedwidespreadaccessto thestate'scontent(Seesection9.6) 6.6Freedomofwill Increasedfreedomofchoiceorfreewill.Theissueoffree willremainsaperennialphilosophicalproblem,notonlywithregardto whetherornotitexistsbutevenastowhatitmightorshouldconsist in(Dennett1984,vanInwagen1983,Hasker1999,Wegner2002).(See theentryon freewill.) Thenotionoffreewillmayitselfremaintoomurkyandcontentious toshedanyclearlightontheroleofconsciousness,butthereisa traditionalintuitionthatthetwoaredeeplylinked. Consciousnesshasbeenthoughttoopenarealmofpossibilities,a sphereofoptionswithinwhichtheconsciousselfmightchooseoract freely.Ataminimum,consciousnessmightseemanecessaryprecondition foranysuchfreedomorself-determination(Hasker1999).Howcouldone engageintherequisitesortoffreechoice,whileremainingsolely withintheunconsciousdomain?Howcanonedetermineone'sownwill withoutbeingconsciousofitandoftheoptionsonehastoshape it. Thefreedomtochoseone'sactionsandtheabilitytodetermine one'sownnatureandfuturedevelopmentmayadmitofmanyinteresting variationsanddegreesratherthanbeingasimpleallornothingmatter, andvariousformsorlevelsofconsciousnessmightbecorrelatedwith correspondingdegreesortypesoffreedomandself-determination (Dennett1984,2003).Thelinkwithfreedomseemsstrongestforthe meta-mentalformofconsciousnessgivenitsemphasisonself-awareness, butpotentialconnectionsalsoseempossibleformostoftheother sortsaswell. 6.7Intrinsicmotivation Intrinsicallymotivatingstates.Atleastsomeconscious statesappeartohavethemotiveforcetheydointrinsically.In particular,thefunctionalandmotivationalrolesofconscious affectivestates,suchaspleasuresandpains,seemintrinsictotheir experientialcharacterandinseparablefromtheirqualitativeand phenomenalproperties,thoughtheviewhasbeenchallenged(Nelkin 1989,Rosenthal1991).Theattractivepositivemotivationalaspectofa pleasureseemsapartofitsdirectlyexperiencedphenomenalfeel,as doesthenegativeaffectivecharacterofapain,atleastinthecase ofnormalnon-pathologicalexperience. Thereisconsiderabledisagreementabouttheextenttowhichthe feelandmotiveforceofpaincandissociateinabnormalcases,and somehavedeniedtheexistenceofsuchintrinsicallymotivatingaspects altogether(Dennett1991).However,atleastinthenormalcase,the negativemotivationalforceofpainseemsbuiltrightintothe feeloftheexperienceitself. Justhowthismightbesoremainslessthanclear,and perhapstheappearanceofintrinsicanddirectlyexperienced motivationalforceisillusory.Butifitisreal,thenitmaybeone ofthemostimportantandevolutionarilyoldestrespectsinwhich consciousnessmakesadifferencetothementalsystemsandprocessesin whichitispresent(Humphreys1992). Othersuggestionshavebeenmadeaboutthepossiblerolesandvalue ofconsciousness,andthesesixsurelydonotexhausttheoptions. Nonetheless,theyareamongthemostprominentrecenthypotheses,and theyprovideafairsurveyofthesortsofanswersthathavebeen offeredtotheWhyquestionbythosewhobelieveconsciousnessdoes indeedmakeadifference. 6.8Constitutiveandcontingentroles Onefurtherpointrequiresclarificationaboutthevariousrespects inwhichtheproposedfunctionsmightanswertheWhyquestion.In particularoneshoulddistinguishbetweenconstitutivecases andcasesofcontingentrealization.Intheformer,fulfilling theroleconstitutesbeingconsciousintherelevantsense,whilein thelattercaseconsciousnessofagivensortisjustonewayamong severalinwhichtherequisiterolemightberealized(VanGulick 1993). Forexample,makinginformationgloballyavailableforusebyawide varietyofsubsystemsandbehavioralapplicationsmayconstituteits beingconsciousintheaccesssense.Bycontrast,evenifthe qualitativeandphenomenalformsofconsciousnessinvolveahighly unifiedanddenselyintegratedrepresentationofobjectivereality,it maybepossibletoproducerepresentationshavingthosefunctional characteristicsbutwhicharenotqualitativeorphenomenalin nature. Thefactthatinusthemodesofrepresentationwiththose characteristicsalsohavequalitativeandphenomenalpropertiesmay reflectcontingenthistoricalfactsabouttheparticulardesign solutionthathappenedtoariseinourevolutionaryancestry.Ifso, theremaybequiteothermeansofachievingacomparableresultwithout qualitativeorphenomenalconsciousness.Whetherthisistherightway tothinkaboutphenomenalandqualitativeconsciousisunclear;perhaps thetietounifiedanddenselyintegratedrepresentationisinfactas intimateandconstitutiveasitseemstobeinthecaseofaccess consciousness(Carruthers2000).Regardlessofhowthatissuegets resolved,itisimportanttonottoconflateconstitutionaccountswith contingentrealizationaccountswhenaddressingthefunctionof consciousnessandansweringthequestionofwhyitexists(Chalmers 1996). 7.Theoriesofconsciousness InresponsetotheWhat,HowandWhyquestionsmanytheoriesof consciousnesshavebeenproposedinrecentyears.However,notall theoriesofconsciousnessaretheoriesofthesamething.Theyvarynot onlyinthespecificsortsofconsciousnesstheytakeastheirobject, butalsointheirtheoreticalaims. Perhapsthelargestdivisionisbetweengeneralmetaphysical theoriesthataimtolocateconsciousnessintheoverallontological schemeofrealityandmorespecifictheoriesthatofferdetailed accountsofitsnature,featuresandrole.Thelinebetweenthetwo sortsoftheoriesblursabit,especiallyinsofarasmanyspecific theoriescarryatleastsomeimplicitcommitmentsonthemoregeneral metaphysicalissues.Nonetheless,itisusefultokeepthedivisionin mindwhensurveyingtherangeofcurrenttheoreticalofferings. 8.Metaphysicaltheoriesofconsciousness Generalmetaphysicaltheoriesofferanswerstotheconsciousversion ofthemind-bodyproblem,“Whatistheontologicalstatusof consciousnessrelativetotheworldofphysicalreality?”The availableresponseslargelyparallelthestandardmind-bodyoptions includingthemainversionsofdualismandphysicalism. 8.1Dualisttheories Dualisttheoriesregardatleastsomeaspectsof consciousnessasfallingoutsidetherealmofthephysical,butspecific formsofdualismdifferinjustwhichaspectsthoseare.(Seetheentry on dualism.) Substancedualism,suchastraditionalCartesiandualism (Descartes1644),assertstheexistenceofbothphysicaland non-physicalsubstances.Suchtheoriesentailtheexistenceof non-physicalmindsorselvesasentitiesinwhichconsciousness inheres.Thoughsubstancedualismisatpresentlargelyoutoffavor, itdoeshavesomecontemporaryproponents(Swinburne1986,Foster1989, 1996). Propertydualisminitsseveralversionsenjoysagreater levelofcurrentsupport.Allsuchtheoriesasserttheexistenceof consciouspropertiesthatareneitheridenticalwithnorreducibleto physicalpropertiesbutwhichmaynonethelessbeinstantiatedbythe verysamethingsthatinstantiatephysicalproperties.Inthatrespect theymightbeclassifiedasdualaspecttheories.Theytake somepartsofreality—organisms,brains,neuralstatesor processes—toinstantiatepropertiesoftwodistinctand disjointsorts:physicalonesandconscious,phenomenalorqualitative ones.Dualaspectorpropertydualisttheoriescanbeofatleastthree differenttypes. Fundamentalpropertydualismregardsconsciousmental propertiesasbasicconstituentsofrealityonaparwithfundamental physicalpropertiessuchaselectromagneticcharge.Theymayinteract incausalandlaw-likewayswithotherfundamentalpropertiessuchas thoseofphysics,butontologicallytheirexistenceisnotdependent uponnorderivativefromanyotherproperties(Chalmers1996). Emergentpropertydualismtreatsconsciouspropertiesas arisingfromcomplexorganizationsofphysicalconstituentsbutas doingsoinaradicalwaysuchthattheemergentresultissomething overandaboveitsphysicalcausesandisnotapriori predictablefromnorexplicableintermsoftheirstrictlyphysical natures.Thecoherenceofsuchemergentviewshasbeenchallenged(Kim 1998)buttheyhavesupporters(Hasker1999). Neutralmonistpropertydualismtreatsbothconscious mentalpropertiesandphysicalpropertiesasinsomewaydependentupon andderivativefromamorebasiclevelofreality,thatinitselfis neithermentalnorphysical(Russell1927,Strawson1994).However,if onetakesdualismtobeaclaimabouttherebeingtwodistinctrealms offundamentalentitiesorproperties,thenperhapsneutralmonism shouldnotbeclassifiedasaversionofpropertydualisminsofaras itdoesnotregardeithermentalorphysicalpropertiesasultimateor fundamental. Panpsychismmightberegardedasafourthtypeofproperty dualisminthatitregardsalltheconstituentsofrealityashaving somepsychic,oratleastproto-psychic,propertiesdistinctfrom whateverphysicalpropertiestheymayhave(Nagel1979).Indeed neutralmonismmightbeconsistentlycombinedwithsomeversion ofpanprotopsychism(Chalmers1996)accordingtowhichthe proto-mentalaspectsofmicro-constituentscangiveriseunder suitableconditionsofcombinationtofullblownconsciousness.(See theentryon panpsychism.) Thenatureoftherelevantproto-psychicaspectremainsunclear,and suchtheoriesfaceadilemmaifofferedinhopeofansweringtheHard Problem.Eithertheproto-psychicpropertiesinvolvethesortof qualitativephenomenalfeelthatgeneratestheHardProblemortheydo not.Iftheydo,itisdifficulttounderstandhowtheycouldpossibly occurasubiquitouspropertiesofreality.Howcouldanelectronora quarkhaveanysuchexperientialfeel?However,iftheproto-psychic propertiesdonotinvolveanysuchfeel,itisnotclearhowtheyare anybetterablethanphysicalpropertiestoaccountforqualitative consciousnessinsolvingtheHardProblem. Amoremodestformofpanpsychismhasbeenadvocatedbythe neuroscientistGiulioTononi(2008)andendorsedbyother neuroscientistsincludingChristofKoch(2012).Thisversionderives fromTononi'sintegratedinformationtheory(IIT)ofconsciousness thatidentifiesconsciousnesswithintegratedinformationwhichcan existinmanydegrees(seesection9.6below).AccordingtoIIT,even asimpleindicatordevicesuchasasinglephotodiodepossessessome degreeofintegratedinformationandthussomelimiteddegreeof consciousness,aconsequencewhichbothTononiandKochembraceasa formofpanpsychism. Avarietyofargumentshavebeengiveninfavorofdualistandother anti-physicalisttheoriesofconsciousness.Somearelargelya prioriinnaturesuchasthosethatappealtothesupposed conceivabilityofzombies(Kirk1970,Chalmers1996)orversionsofthe knowledgeargument(Jackson1982,1986)whichaimtoreachan anti-physicalistconclusionabouttheontologyofconsciousnessfrom theapparentlimitsonourabilitytofullyunderstandthequalitative aspectsofconsciousexperiencethroughthird-personphysicalaccounts ofthebrainprocesses.(SeeJackson1998,2004foracontraryview; seealsoentrieson Zombies, and Qualia:TheKnowledgeArgument) Otherargumentsfordualismaremadeonmoreempiricalgrounds,such asthosethatappealtosupposedcausalgapsinthechainsofphysical causationinthebrain(EcclesandPopper1977)orthosebasedon allegedanomaliesinthetemporalorderofconsciousawareness(Libet 1982,1985).Dualistargumentsofbothsortshavebeenmuchdisputed byphysicalists(P.S.Churchland1981,DennettandKinsbourne 1992). 8.2Physicalisttheories Mostothermetaphysicaltheoriesofconsciousnessareversionsof physicalismofonefamiliarsortoranother. Eliminativisttheoriesreductivelydenytheexistenceof consciousnessoratleasttheexistenceofsomeofitscommonly acceptedsortsorfeatures.(Seetheentryon eliminativematerialism.) Theradicaleliminativistsrejecttheverynotionofconsciousnessas muddledorwrongheadedandclaimthattheconscious/nonconscious distinctionfailstocutmentalrealityatitsjoints(Wilkes1984, 1988).Theyregardtheideaofconsciousnessassufficientlyoff targettomeriteliminationandreplacementbyotherconceptsand distinctionsmorereflectiveofthetruenatureofmind (P.S.Churchland1983). Mosteliminativistsaremorequalifiedintheirnegativeassessment. Ratherthanrejectingthenotionoutright,theytakeissueonlywith someoftheprominentfeaturesthatitiscommonlythoughttoinvolve, suchasqualia(Dennett1990,Carruthers2000),theconsciousself (Dennett1992),orthesocalled“CartesianTheater”where thetemporalsequenceofconsciousexperiencegetsinternally projected(DennettandKinsbourne1992).Moremodesteliminativists, likeDennett,thustypicallycombinetheirqualifieddenialswitha positivetheoryofthoseaspectsofconsciousnesstheytakeasreal, suchastheMultipleDraftsModel(section 9.3 below). Identitytheory,atleaststrictpsycho-physicaltype-type identitytheory,offersanotherstronglyreductiveoptionby identifyingconsciousmentalproperties,statesandprocesseswith physicalones,mosttypicallyofaneuralorneurophysiological nature.Ifhavingaqualitativeconsciousexperienceofphenomenal redjustisbeinginabrainstatewiththerelevant neurophysiologicalproperties,thensuchexperientialpropertiesare realbuttheirrealityisastraightforwardlyphysicalreality. Type-typeidentitytheoryissocalledbecauseitidentifies mentalandphysicaltypesorpropertiesonaparwithidentifyingthe propertyofbeingwaterwiththepropertyofbeingcomposedof H2Omolecules.Afterabriefperiodofpopularityinthe earlydaysofcontemporaryphysicalismduringthe1950sand60s(Place 1956,Smart1959)ithasbeenfarlesswidelyheldbecauseofproblems suchasthemultiplerealizationobjectionaccordingtowhichmental propertiesaremoreabstractandthuscapableofbeingrealizedby manydiverseunderlyingstructuralorchemicalsubstrates(Fodor1974, HellmanandThompson1975).Ifoneandthesameconsciousproperty canberealizedbydifferentneurophysiological(oreven non-neurophysiological)propertiesindifferentorganisms,thenthe twopropertiescannotbestrictlyidentical. Nonethelessthetype-typeidentitytheoryhasenjoyedarecentif modestresurgenceatleastwithrespecttoqualiaorqualitative consciousproperties.Thishasbeeninpartbecausetreatingthe relevantpsycho-physicallinkasanidentityisthoughtbysometo offerawayofdissolvingtheexplanatorygapproblem(Hilland McLaughlin1998,Papineau1995,2003).Theyarguethatifthe consciousqualitativepropertyandtheneuralpropertyareidentical, thenthereisnoneedtoexplainhowthelattercausesorgivesrise totheformer.Itdoesnotcauseit,itisit.And thusthereisnogaptobridge,andnofurtherexplanationisneeded. Identitiesarenotthesortofthingthatcanbeexplained,since nothingisidenticalwithanythingbutitself,anditmakesnosense toaskwhysomethingisidenticalwithitself. However,otherscontendthattheappealtotype-typeidentitydoesnot soobviouslyvoidtheneedforexplanation(Levine2001).Eveniftwo descriptionsorconceptsinfactrefertooneandthesameproperty, onemaystillreasonablyexpectsomeexplanationofthatconvergence, someaccountofhowtheypickoutoneandthesamethingdespitenot initiallyorintuitivelyseemingtodoso.Inothercasesof empiricallydiscoveredpropertyidentities,suchasthatofheatand kineticenergy,thereisastorytobetoldthatexplainsthe co-referentialconvergence,anditseemsfairtoexpectthesamein thepsycho-physicalcase.Thusappealingtotype-typeidentitiesmay notinitselfsufficetodissolvetheexplanatorygapproblem. Mostphysicalisttheoriesofconsciousnessareneithereliminativist norbasedonstricttype-typeidentities.Theyacknowledgethereality ofconsciousnessbutaimtolocateitwithinthephysicalworldonthe basisofsomepsycho-physicalrelationshortofstrictproperty identity. Amongthecommonvariantsarethosethattakeconsciousrealityto superveneonthephysical,becomposedofthe physical,orberealizedbythephysical. Functionalisttheoriesinparticularrelyheavilyonthe notionofrealizationtoexplicatetherelationbetween consciousnessandthephysical.Accordingtofunctionalism,astateor processcountsasbeingofagivenmentalorconscioustypeinvirtue ofthefunctionalroleitplayswithinasuitablyorganizedsystem (Block1980a).Agivenphysicalstaterealizestherelevantconscious mentaltypebyplayingtheappropriaterolewithinthelargerphysical systemthatcontainsit.(Seetheentryon functionalism.) Thefunctionalistoftenappealstoanalogieswithotherinter-level relations,asbetweenthebiologicalandbiochemicalorthechemical andtheatomic.Ineachcasepropertiesorfactsatonelevelare realizedbycomplexinteractionsbetweenitemsatanunderlying level. Criticsoffunctionalismoftendenythatconsciousnesscanbe adequatelyexplicatedinfunctionalterms(Block1980a,1980b,Levine 1983,Chalmers1996).Accordingtosuchcritics,consciousnessmayhave interestingfunctionalcharacteristicsbutitsnatureisnot essentiallyfunctional.Suchclaimsaresometimessupportedbyappeal tothesupposedpossibilityofabsentorinvertedqualia,i.e.,the possibilityofbeingswhoarefunctionallyequivalenttonormalhumans butwhohavereversedqualiaornoneatall.Thestatusofsuch possibilitiesiscontroversial(Shoemaker1981,Dennett1990, Carruthers2000),butifacceptedtheywouldseemtoposeaproblemfor thefunctionalist.(Seetheentryon qualia.) Thosewhogroundontologicalphysicalismontherealizationrelation oftencombineitwithanonreductiveviewattheconceptualor representationallevelthatstressestheautonomyofthespecial sciencesandthedistinctmodesofdescriptionandcognitiveaccess theyprovide. Non-reductivephysicalismofthissortdeniesthatthe theoreticalandconceptualresourcesappropriateandadequatefor dealingwithfactsattheleveloftheunderlyingsubstrateor realizationlevelmustbeadequateaswellfordealingwiththoseat therealizedlevel(Putnam1975,Boyd1980).Asnotedaboveinresponse totheHowquestion,onecanbelievethatalleconomicfactsare physicallyrealizedwithoutthinkingthattheresourcesofthephysical sciencesprovideallthecognitiveandconceptualtoolsweneedfor doingeconomics(Fodor1974). Nonreductivephysicalismhasbeenchallengedforitsallegedfailure to“payitsphysicalistdues”inreductivecoin.Itis faultedforsupposedlynotgivinganadequateaccountofhowconscious propertiesareorcouldberealizedbyunderlyingneural,physicalor functionalstructuresorprocesses(Kim1987,1998).Indeedithas beenchargedwithincoherencebecauseofitsattempttocombinea claimofphysicalrealizationwiththedenialoftheabilitytospell outthatrelationinastrictandaprioriintelligibleway (Jackson2004). However,asnotedaboveindiscussionoftheHowquestion, nonreductivephysicalistsreplybyagreeingthatsomeaccountof psycho-physicalrealizationisindeedneeded,butaddingthatthe relevantaccountmayfallfarshortofapriorideducibility, yetstillsufficetosatisfyourlegitimateexplanatorydemands(McGinn 1991,VanGulick1985).Theissueremainsunderdebate. 9.SpecificTheoriesofConsciousness Althoughtherearemanygeneralmetaphysical/ontologicaltheoriesof consciousness,thelistofspecificdetailedtheoriesaboutitsnature isevenlongerandmorediverse.Nobriefsurveycouldbecloseto comprehensive,butsevenmaintypesoftheoriesmayhelptoindicatethe basicrangeofoptions:higher-ordertheories,representational theories,interpretativenarrativetheories,cognitivetheories, neuraltheories,quantumtheoriesandnonphysicaltheories.The categoriesarenotmutuallyexclusive;forexample,manycognitive theoriesalsoproposeaneuralsubstratefortherelevantcognitive processes.Nonethelessgroupingtheminthesevenclassesprovidesa basicoverview. 9.1Higher-ordertheories Higher-order(HO)theoriesanalyzethenotionofaconsciousmental stateintermsofreflexivemeta-mentalself-awareness.Thecoreidea isthatwhatmakesamentalstateMaconsciousmentalstateisthe factthatitisaccompaniedbyasimultaneousandnon-inferential higher-order(i.e.,meta-mental)statewhosecontentisthatoneisnow inM.Havingaconsciousdesireforsomechocolateinvolvesbeingin twomentalstates;onemusthavebothadesireforsomechocolateand alsoahigher-orderstatewhosecontentisthatoneisnowhavingjust suchadesire.Unconsciousmentalstatesareunconsciouspreciselyin thatwelacktherelevanthigher-orderstatesaboutthem.Theirbeing unconsciousconsistsinthefactthatwearenotreflexivelyand directlyawareofbeinginthem.(Seetheentryon higher-ordertheoriesofconsciousness.) Higher-ordertheoriescomeintwomainvariantsthatdiffer concerningthepsychologicalmodeoftherelevantconscious-making meta-mentalstates.Higher-orderthought(HOT)theoriestakethe requiredhigher-orderstatetobeanassertoricthought-likemeta-state (Rosenthal1986,1993).Higher-orderperception(HOP)theoriestake themtobemoreperception-likeandassociatedwithakindofinner senseandintra-mentalmonitoringsystemsofsomesort(Armstrong1981, Lycan1987,1996). Eachhasitsrelativestrengthsandproblems.HOTtheoristsnote thatwehavenoorgansofinnersenseandclaimthatweexperienceno sensoryqualitiesotherthanthosepresentedtousbyouterdirected perception.HOPtheoristsontheotherhandcanarguethattheirview explainssomeoftheadditionalconditionsrequiredbyHOaccountsas naturalconsequencesoftheperception-likenatureoftherelevant higher-orderstates.Inparticularthedemandsthatthe conscious-makingmeta-statebenoninferentialandsimultaneouswithits lowerlevelmentalobjectmightbeexplainedbytheparallelconditions thattypicallyapplytoperception.Weperceivewhatishappeningnow, andwedosoinawaythatinvolvesnoinferences,atleastnotany explicitpersonal-levelinferences.Thoseconditionsarenoless necessaryontheHOTviewbutareleftunexplainedbyit,whichmight seemtogivesomeexplanatoryadvantagetotheHOPmodel(Lycan2004, VanGulick2000),thoughsomeHOTtheoristsargueotherwise(Carruthers 2000). Whatevertheirrespectivemerits,bothHOPandHOTtheoriesfacesome commonchallenges,includingwhatmightbecalledthegenerality problem.Havingathoughtorperceptionofagiven itemX—beitarock,apenorapotato—doesnot ingeneralmakeXaconsciousX.Seeingorthinking ofthepotatoonthecounterdoesnotmakeitaconsciouspotato.Why thenshouldhavingathoughtorperceptionofagivendesireora memorymakeitaconsciousdesireormemory(Dretske1995,Byrne 1997).Norwillitsufficetonotethatwedonotapplytheterm “conscious”torocksorpensthatweperceiveorthinkof, butonlytomentalstatesthatweperceiveorthinkof(Lycan1997, Rosenthal1997).Thatmaybetrue,butwhatisneededissomeaccount ofwhyitisappropriatetodoso. Thehigher-orderviewismostobviouslyrelevanttothemeta-mental formsofconsciousness,butsomeofitssupporterstakeittoexplain othertypesofconsciousnessaswell,includingthemoresubjective whatit'slikeandqualitativetypes.Onecommonstrategyistoanalyze qualiaasmentalfeaturesthatarecapableofoccurringunconsciously; forexampletheymightbeexplainedaspropertiesofinnerstateswhose structuredsimilarityrelationsgivenrisetobeliefsaboutobjective similaritiesintheworld(Shoemaker1975,1990).Thoughunconscious qualiacanplaythatfunctionalrole,thereneedbenothingthatitis liketobeinastatethathasthem(Nelkin1989,Rosenthal1991, 1997).AccordingtotheHOtheorist,what-it's-likenessenters onlywhenwebecomeawareofthatfirst-orderstateanditsqualitative propertiesbyhavinganappropriatemeta-statedirectedatit. CriticsoftheHOviewhavedisputedthataccount,andsomehave arguedthatthenotionofunconsciousqualiaonwhichitreliesis incoherent(Papineau2002).WhetherornotsuchproposedHOaccountsof qualiaaresuccessful,itisimportanttonotethatmostHOadvocates takethemselvestobeofferingacomprehensivetheoryofconsciousness, oratleastthecoreofsuchageneraltheory,ratherthanmerelyone limitedtosomespecialmeta-mentalformsofit. OthervariantsofHOtheorygobeyondthestandardHOTandHOP versionsincludingsomethatanalyzeconsciousnessintermsof dispositionalratherthanoccurrenthigher-orderthoughts(Carruthers 2000).Othersappealtoimplicitratherthanexplicithigher-order understandingandweakenorremovethestandardassumptionthatthe meta-statemustbedistinctandseparatefromitslower-orderobject (Gennaro1995,VanGulick2000,2004)withsuchviewsoverlappingwith socalledreflexivetheoriesdiscussedinthesection.Othervariants ofHOtheorycontinuetobeoffered,anddebatebetweensupportersand criticsofthebasicapproachremainsactive.(Seetherecentpapers inGennaro2004.) 9.2Reflexivetheories Reflexivetheories,likehigher-ordertheories,implyastronglink betweenconsciousnessandself-awareness.Theydifferinthatthey locatetheaspectofself-awarenessdirectlywithintheconscious stateitselfratherthaninadistinctmeta-statedirectedatit.The ideathatconsciousstatesinvolveadoubleintentionalitygoesback atleasttoBrentano(1874)inthe19thcentury.Theconsciousstate isintentionallydirectedatanobjectoutsideitself—suchasa treeorchairinthecaseofaconsciousperception—aswellas intentionallydirectedatitself.Oneandthesamestateisbothan outer-directedawarenessandanawarenessofitself.Severalrecent theorieshaveclaimedthatsuchreflexiveawarenessisacentral featureofconsciousmentalstates.Someviewthemselvesasvariants ofhigher-ordertheory(Gennaro2004,2012)whileothersrejectthe higher-ordercategoryanddescribetheirtheoriesaspresentinga “same-order”accountofconsciousnessasself-awareness (Kriegel2009).Yetotherschallengetheleveldistinctionby analyzingthemeta-intentionalcontentasimplicitinthephenomenal first-ordercontentofconsciousstates,asinsocalledHigher-Order GlobalStatemodels(HOGS)(VanGulick2004,2006).Asampleofpapers, somesupportingandsomeattackingthereflexiveviewcanbefoundin KrigelandWilliford(2006). 9.3Representationalisttheories Almostalltheoriesofconsciousnessregarditashaving representationalfeatures,butsocalledrepresentationalisttheories aredefinedbythestrongerviewthatitsrepresentationalfeatures exhaustitsmentalfeatures(Harman1990,Tye1995,2000).Accordingto therepresentationalist,consciousmentalstateshavenomental propertiesotherthantheirrepresentationalproperties.Thustwo consciousorexperientialstatesthatsharealltheirrepresentational propertieswillnotdifferinanymentalrespect. Theexactforceoftheclaimdependsonhowoneinterpretstheidea ofbeing“representationallythesame”forwhichthereare manyplausiblealternativecriteria.Onecoulddefineitcoarselyin termsofsatisfactionortruthconditions,butunderstoodinthatway therepresentationalistthesisseemsclearlyfalse.Therearetoomany waysinwhichstatesmightsharetheirsatisfactionortruthconditions yetdiffermentally,includingthosethatconcerntheirmodeof conceptualizingorpresentingthoseconditions. Attheoppositeextreme,onecouldcounttwostatesas representationallydistinctiftheydifferedinanyfeaturesthat playedaroleintheirrepresentationalfunctionoroperation.Onsuch aliberalreadinganydifferencesinthebearersofcontentwouldcount asrepresentationaldifferenceseveniftheyborethesameintentional orrepresentationalcontent;theymightdifferonlyintheir meansormodeofrepresentationnottheir content. Suchareadingwouldofcourseincreasetheplausibilityofthe claimthataconsciousstate'srepresentationalpropertiesexhaustits mentalpropertiesbutatthecostofsignificantlyweakeningoreven trivializingthethesis.Thustherepresentationalistseemstoneedan interpretationofrepresentationalsamenessthatgoesbeyond meresatisfactionconditionsandreflectsalltheintentionalor contentfulaspectsofrepresentationwithoutbeingsensitivetomere differencesinunderlyingnon-contentfulfeaturesoftheprocessesat therealizationlevel.Thusmostrepresentationalistsprovideconditions forconsciousexperiencethatincludebothacontentconditionplus somefurthercausalroleorformatrequirements(Tye1995,Dretske 1995,Carruthers2000).Otherrepresentationalistsaccepttheexistence ofqualiabuttreatthemasobjectivepropertiesthatexternalobjects arerepresentedashaving,i.e.,theytreatthemas representedpropertiesratherthanasproperties ofrepresentationsormentalstates(Dretske1995,Lycan 1996). Representationalismcanbeunderstoodasaqualifiedformof eliminativisminsofarasitdeniestheexistenceofpropertiesofa sortthatconsciousmentalstatesarecommonlythoughtto have—oratleastseemtohave—namelythosethatarementalbutnot representational.Qualia,atleastifunderstoodasintrinsicmonadic propertiesofconsciousstatesaccessibletointrospection,wouldseem tobethemostobvioustargetsforsuchelimination.Indeedpartofthe motivationforrepresentationalismistoshowthatonecanaccommodate allthefactsaboutconsciousness,perhapswithinaphysicalist framework,withoutneedingtofindroomforqualiaoranyother apparentlynon-representationalmentalproperties(Dennett1990,Lycan 1996,Carruthers2000). Representationalismhasbeenquitepopularinrecentyearsandhad manydefenders,butitremainshighlycontroversialandintuitions clashaboutkeycasesandthoughtexperiments(Block1996).In particularthepossibilityofinvertedqualiaprovidesacrucialtest case.Toanti-representationalists,themerelogicalpossibilityof invertedqualiashowsthatconsciousstatescandifferinasignificant mentalrespectwhilecoincidingrepresentationally. Representationalistsinreplydenyeitherthepossibilityofsuch inversionoritsallegedimport(Dretske1995,Tye2000). Manyotherargumentshavebeenmadeforandagainst representationalism,suchasthoseconcerningperceptionsindifferent sensemodalitiesofoneandthesamestateofaffairs—seeing andfeelingthesamecube—whichmightseemtoinvolvemental differencesdistinctfromhowtherelevantstatesrepresenttheworld tobe(Peacocke1983,Tye2003).Ineachcase,bothsidescanmuster strongintuitionsandargumentativeingenuity.Livelydebate continues. 9.4NarrativeInterpretativeTheories Sometheoriesofconsciousnessstresstheinterpretativenatureof factsaboutconsciousness.Accordingtosuchviews,whatisorisnot consciousisnotalwaysadeterminatefact,oratleastnotso independentofalargercontextofinterpretativejudgments.Themost prominentphilosophicalexampleistheMultipleDraftsModel(MDM)of consciousness,advancedbyDanielDennett(1991).Itcombineselements ofbothrepresentationalismandhigher-ordertheorybutdoessoina waythatvariesinterestinglyfromthemorestandardversionsof eitherprovidingamoreinterpretationalandlessstronglyrealist viewofconsciousness. TheMDMincludesmanydistinctbutinterrelatedfeatures.Itsname reflectsthefactthatatanygivenmomentcontentfixationsofmany sortsareoccurringthroughoutthebrain.Whatmakessomeofthese contentsconsciousisnotthattheyoccurinaprivilegedspatialor functionallocation—thesocalled“Cartesian Theater”—norinaspecialmodeorformat,allofwhichthe MDMdenies.RatheritamatterofwhatDennettcalls“cerebral celebrity”,i.e.,thedegreetowhichagivencontentinfluences thefuturedevelopmentofothercontentsthroughoutthebrain, especiallywithregardtohowthoseeffectsaremanifestinthe reportsandbehaviorsthatthepersonmakesinresponsetovarious probesthatmightindicateherconsciousstate.OneoftheMDM'skey claimsisthatdifferentprobes(e.g.,beingaskeddifferent questionsorbeingindifferentcontextsthatmakediffering behavioraldemands)mayelicitdifferentanswersabouttheperson's consciousstate.Moreover,accordingtotheMDMtheremaybeno probe-independentfactofthematteraboutwhattheperson'sconscious statereallywas.Hencethe“multiple”oftheMultiple DraftsModel. TheMDMisrepresentationalistinthatitanalyzesconsciousnessin termsofcontentrelations.Italsodeniestheexistenceofqualiaand thusrejectsanyattempttodistinguishconsciousstatesfrom nonconsciousstatesbytheirpresence.Itrejectsaswellthenotion oftheselfasaninnerobserver,whetherlocatedintheCartesian Theaterorelsewhere.TheMDMtreatstheselfasanemergentor virtualaspectofthecoherentroughlyseriallynarrativethatis constructedthroughtheinteractiveplayofcontentsinthe system.Manyofthosecontentsareboundtogetherattheintentional levelasperceptionsorfixationsfromarelativelyunifiedand temporallyextendedpointofview,i.e.,theycohereintheircontents asiftheyweretheexperiencesofaongoingself.Butitistheorder ofdependencethatiscrucialtotheMDMaccount.Therelevant contentsarenotunifiedbecausetheyareallobservedbyasingle self,butjusttheconverse.Itisbecausetheyareunifiedand coherentatthelevelofcontentthattheycountastheexperiencesof asingleself,atleastofasinglevirtualself. ItisinthisrespectthattheMDMsharessomeelementswith higher-ordertheories.Thecontentsthatcomposetheserialnarrative areatleastimplicitlythoseofanongoingifvirtualself,anditis theythataremostlikelytobeexpressedinthereportstheperson makesofherconsciousstateinresponsetovariousprobes.Theythus involveacertaindegreeofreflexivityorself-awarenessofthesort thatiscentraltohigher-ordertheories,butthehigher-orderaspect ismoreanimplicitfeatureofthestreamofcontentsratherthan presentindistinctexplicithigher-orderstatesofthesortfoundin standardHOtheories. Dennett'sMDMhasbeenhighlyinfluentialbuthasalsodrawn criticism,especiallyfromthosewhofinditinsufficientlyrealistin itsviewofconsciousnessandatbestincompleteinachievingits statedgoaltofullyexplainit(Block1994,Dretske1994,Levine 1994).Manyofitscriticsacknowledgetheinsightandvalueofthe MDM,butdenythattherearenorealfactsofconsciousnessotherthan thosecapturedbyit(Rosenthal1994,VanGulick1994,Akins 1996). Fromamoreempiricalperspective,theneuroscientistMichael Gazzaniga(2011)hasintroducedtheideaofan“interpreter module”basedinthelefthemispherethatmakessenseofour actionsinanyinferentialwayandconstructsanongoingnarrativeof ouractionsandexperience.Thoughthetheoryisnotintendedasa completetheoryofconsciousness,itaccordsamajorroletosuch interpretativenarrativeactivity. 9.5CognitiveTheories Anumbertheoriesofconsciousnessassociateitwithadistinct cognitivearchitectureorwithaspecialpatternofactivitywiththat structure. GlobalWorkspace.Amajorpsychologicalexampleofthe cognitiveapproachistheGlobalWorkspacetheory.Asinitially developedbyBernardBaars(1988))globalworkspacetheorydescribes consciousnessintermsofacompetitionamongprocessorsandoutputs foralimitedcapacityresourcethat“broadcasts”informationfor widespreadaccessanduse.Beingavailableinthatwaytotheglobal workspacemakesinformationconsciousatleastintheaccesssense.It isavailableforreportandtheflexiblecontrolofbehavior.Much likeDennett's“cerebralcelebrity”,beingbroadcastintheworkspace makescontentsmoreaccessibleandinfluentialwithrespecttoother contentsandotherprocessors.Atthesametimetheoriginalcontent isstrengthenedbyrecurrentsupportbackfromtheworkspaceandfrom othercontentswithwhichitcoheres.Thecapacitylimitsonthe workspacecorrespondtothelimitstypicallyplacedonfocalattention orworkingmemoryinmanycognitivemodels. Themodelhasbeenfurtherdevelopedwithproposedconnectionsto particularneuralandfunctionalbrainsystemsbyStanislasDehaene andothers(2000).Ofspecialimportanceistheclaimthat consciousnessinboththeaccessandphenomenalsenseoccurswhenand onlywhentherelevantcontententersthelargerglobalnetwork involvingbothprimarysensoryareasaswellasmanyotherareas includingfrontalandparietalareasassociatedwith attention.Dehaeneclaimsthatconsciousperceptionbeginsonlywith the“ignition”ofthatlargerglobalnetwork;activityintheprimary sensoryareaswillnotsufficenomatterhowintenseorrecurrent (thoughseethecontraryviewofVictorLammeinsection9.7). AttendedIntermediateRepresentation.Anothercognitivetheory isJessePrinz's(2012)AttendedIntermediatelevelRepresentation theory(AIR).Thetheoryisaneuro-cognitivehybridaccountof conscious.AccordingtoAIRtheory,aconsciousperceptionmustmeet bothcognitiveandneuralconditions.Itmustbearepresentationofa perceptuallyintermediatepropertywhichPrinzarguesaretheonly propertiesofwhichweareawareinconsciousexperience—we experienceonlybasicfeaturesofexternalobjectssuchascolors, shapes,tones,andfeels.AccordingtoPrinz,ourawarenessofhigher levelproperties—suchasbeingapinetreeormycarkeys—is whollyamatterofjudgingandnotofconsciousexperience.Hencethe IntermediateRepresentational(IR)aspectofAIR.Tobeconscious sucharepresentedcontentmustalsobeAttended(theAaspectof AIR).Prinzproposesaparticularneuralsubstrateforeachcomponent. Heidentifiestheintermediatelevelrepresentationswithgamma (40–80hz)vectoractivityinsensorycortexandtheattentional componentwithsynchronizedoscillationsthatcanincorporatethat gammavectoractivity. 9.6InformationIntegrationTheory Theintegrationofinformationfrommanysourcesisanimportant featureofconsciousnessand,asnotedabove(section6.4),isoften citedasoneofitsmajorfunctions.Contentintegrationplaysan importantroleinvarioustheoriesespeciallyglobalworkspacetheory (section9.3).However,aproposalbytheneuroscientistGiulio Tononi(2008)goesfurtherinidentifyingconsciousnesswith integratedinformationandassertingthatinformationintegrationof therelevantsortisbothnecessaryandsufficientforconsciousness regardlessofthesubstrateinwhichitisrealized(whichneednotbe neuralorbiological).AccordingtoTononi'sIntegratedInformation Theory(IIT),consciousnessisapurelyinformation-theoreticproperty ofsystems.Heproposesamathematicalmeasureφthataimsto measurenotmerelytheinformationinthepartsofagivensystembut alsotheinformationcontainedintheorganizationofthesystemover andabovethatinitsparts.φthuscorrespondstothesystem's degreeofinformationalintegration.Suchasystemcancontainmany overlappingcomplexesandthecomplexwiththehighestφvalue willbeconsciousaccordingtoIIT. AccordingtoIIT,consciousnessvariesinquantityandcomesin manydegreeswhichcorrespondtoφvalues.Thusevenasimple systemsuchasinglephotodiodewillbeconscioustosomedegreeif itisnotcontainedwithinalargercomplex.Inthatsense,IIT impliesaformofpanpsychismthatTononiexplicitlyendorses. AccordingtoIIT,thequalityoftherelevantconsciousnessis determinedbythetotalityofinformationalrelationswithinthe relevantintegratedcomplex.ThusIITaimstoexplainboththe quantityandqualityofphenomenalconsciousness.Other neuroscientists,notablyChristofKoch,havealsoendorsedtheIIT approach(Koch2012). 9.7NeuralTheories Neuraltheoriesofconsciousnesscomeinmanyforms,thoughmostin somewayconcernthesocalled“neuralcorrelatesof consciousness”orNCCs.Unlessoneisadualistorother non-physicalist,morethanmerecorrelationisrequired;atleastsome NCCsmustbetheessentialsubstratesofconsciousness.Anexplanatory neuraltheoryneedstoexplainwhyorhowtherelevantcorrelations exist,andifthetheoryiscommittedtophysicalismthatwillrequire showinghowtheunderlyingneuralsubstratescouldbeidenticalwith theirneuralcorrelatesoratleastrealizethembysatisfyingthe requiredrolesorconditions(Metzinger2000). Suchtheoriesarediversenotonlyintheneuralprocessesor propertiestowhichtheyappealbutalsointheaspectsof consciousnesstheytakeastheirrespectiveexplananda.Somearebased onhigh-levelsystemicfeaturesofthebrain,butothersfocusonmore specificphysiologicalorstructuralproperties,withcorresponding differencesintheirintendedexplanatorytargets.Mostinsomeway aimtoconnectwiththeoriesofconsciousnessatotherlevelsof descriptionsuchascognitive,representationalorhigher-order theories. Asamplingofrecentneuraltheoriesmightincludemodelsthat appealtoglobalintegratedfields(Kinsbourne),bindingthrough synchronousoscillation(Singer1999,CrickandKoch1990), NMDA-mediatedtransientneuralassemblies(Flohr1995),thalamically modulatedpatternsofcorticalactivation(Llinas2001),reentrant corticalloops(Edelman1989),comparatormechanismsthatengagein continuousaction-prediction-assessmentloopsbetweenfrontaland midbrainareas(Gray1995),lefthemispherebasedinterpretative processes(Gazzaniga1988),andemotivesomatosensoryhemostatic processesbasedinthefrontal-limbicnexus(Damasio1999)orinthe periaqueductalgray(Panksepp1998). Ineachcasetheaimistoexplainhoworganizationandactivityat therelevantneurallevelcouldunderlieoneoranothermajortypeor featureofconsciousness.Globalfieldsortransientsynchronous assembliescouldunderlietheintentionalunityofphenomenal consciousness.NMDA-basedplasticity,specificthalamicprojections intothecortex,orregularoscillatorywavescouldallcontributeto theformationofshorttermbutwidespreadneuralpatternsor regularitiesneededtoknitintegratedconsciousexperienceoutofthe localactivityindiversespecializedbrainmodules.Lefthemisphere interpretativeprocessescouldprovideabasisfornarrativeformsof consciousself-awareness.Thusitispossibleformultipledistinct neuraltheoriestoallbetrue,witheachcontributingsomepartial understandingofthelinksbetweenconsciousmentalityinitsdiverse formsandtheactivebrainatitsmanylevelsofcomplexorganization andstructure. Oneparticularrecentcontroversyhasconcernedtheissueofwhether globalormerelylocalrecurrentactivityissufficientforphenomenal consciousness.Supportersoftheglobalneuronalworkspacemodel (Dehaene2000)havearguedthatconsciousnessofanysortcanoccur onlywhencontentsareactivatedwithalargescalepatternof recurrentactivityinvolvingfrontalandparietalareasaswellas primarysensoryareasofcortex.Othersinparticularthe psychologistVictorLamme(2006)andthephilosopherNedBlock(2007) havearguedthatlocalrecurrentactivitybetweenhigherandlower areaswithinsensorycortex(e.g.withvisualcortex)cansufficefor phenomenalconsciousnessevenintheabsenceofverbalreportability andotherindicatorsofaccessconsciousness. 9.8Quantumtheories Otherphysicaltheorieshavegonebeyondtheneuralandplacedthe naturallocusofconsciousnessatafarmorefundamentallevel,in particularatthemicro-physicallevelofquantumphenomena.According tosuchtheories,thenatureandbasisofconsciousnesscannotbe adequatelyunderstoodwithintheframeworkofclassicalphysicsbut mustbesoughtwithinthealternativepictureofphysicalreality providedbyquantummechanics.Theproponentsofthequantum consciousnessapproachregardtheradicallyalternativeandoften counterintuitivenatureofquantumphysicsasjustwhatisneededto overcomethesupposedexplanatoryobstaclesthatconfrontmorestandard attemptstobridgethepsycho-physicalgap. Againthereareawiderangeofspecifictheoriesandmodelsthat havebeenproposed,appealingtoavarietyofquantumphenomenato explainadiversityoffeaturesofconsciousness.Itwouldbe impossibletocatalogthemhereorevenexplaininanysubstantialway thekeyfeaturesofquantummechanicstowhichtheyappeal.However,a briefselectivesurveymayprovideasense,howeverpartialand obscure,oftheoptionsthathavebeenproposed. ThephysicistRogerPenrose(1989,1994)andtheanesthesiologist StuartHameroff(1998)havechampionedamodelaccordingtowhich consciousnessarisesthroughquantumeffectsoccurringwithin subcellularstructuresinternaltoneuronsknownas microtubules.Themodelpositssocalled“objective collapses”whichinvolvethequantumsystemmovingfroma superpositionofmultiplepossiblestatestoasingledefinitestate, butwithouttheinterventionofanobserverormeasurementasinmost quantummechanicalmodels.AccordingtothePenroseandHameroff,the environmentinternaltothemicrotubulesisespeciallysuitablefor suchobjectivecollapses,andtheresultingself-collapsesproducea coherentflowregulatingneuronalactivityandmakingnon-algorithmic mentalprocessespossible. ThepsychiatristIanMarshallhasofferedamodelthataimsto explainthecoherentunityofconsciousnessbyappealtotheproduction withinthebrainofaphysicalstateakintothatofa Bose-Einsteincondensate.Thelatterisaquantumphenomenonin whichacollectionofatomsactsasasinglecoherententityandthe distinctionbetweendiscreteatomsislost.Whilebrainstatesarenot literallyexamplesofBose-Einsteincondensates,reasonshavebeen offeredtoshowwhybrainsarelikelytogiverisetostatesthatare capableofexhibitingasimilarcoherence(MarshallandZohar 1990). Abasisforconsciousnesshasalsobeensoughtin theholisticnatureofquantummechanicsandthephenomenonof entanglement,accordingtowhichparticlesthathave interactedcontinuetohavetheirnaturesdependuponeachothereven aftertheirseparation.Unsurprisinglythesemodelshavebeentargeted especiallyatexplainingthecoherenceofconsciousness,buttheyhave alsobeeninvokedasamoregeneralchallengetotheatomistic conceptionoftraditionalphysicsaccordingtowhichthepropertiesof wholesaretobeexplainedbyappealtothepropertiesoftheirparts plustheirmodeofcombination,amethodofexplanationthatmightbe regardedasunsuccessfultodateinexplainingconsciousness (Silberstein1998,2001). Othershavetakenquantummechanicstoindicatethatconsciousness isanabsolutelyfundamentalpropertyofphysicalreality,onethat needstobebroughtinattheverymostbasiclevel(Stapp1993).They haveappealedespeciallytotheroleoftheobserverinthecollapseof thewavefunction,i.e.,thecollapseofquantumrealityfroma superpositionofpossiblestatestoasingledefinitestatewhena measurementismade.Suchmodelsmayormaynotembraceaformof quasi-idealism,inwhichtheveryexistenceofphysicalrealitydepends uponitsbeingconsciouslyobserved. Therearemanyotherquantummodelsofconsciousnesstobefoundin theliterature—someadvocatingaradicallyrevisionist metaphysicsandothersnot—butthesefourprovideareasonable, thoughpartial,sampleofthealternatives. 9.9Non-physicaltheories Mostspecifictheoriesofconsciousness—whethercognitive, neuralorquantummechanical—aimtoexplainormodel consciousnessasanaturalfeatureofthephysicalworld.However, thosewhorejectaphysicalistontologyofconsciousnessmustfindways ofmodelingitasanonphysicalaspectofreality.Thusthosewhoadopt adualistoranti-physicalistmetaphysicalviewmustintheendprovide specificmodelsofconsciousnessdifferentfromthefivetypesabove. Bothsubstancedualistsandpropertydualistsmustdevelopthedetails oftheirtheoriesinwaysthatarticulatethespecificnaturesofthe relevantnon-physicalfeaturesofrealitywithwhichtheyequate consciousnessortowhichtheyappealinordertoexplainit. Avarietyofsuchmodelshavebeenproposedincludingthefollowing. DavidChalmers(1996)hasofferedanadmittedlyspeculativeversionof panpsychismwhichappealstothenotionofinformationnotonlyto explainpsycho-physicalinvariancesbetweenphenomenalandphysically realizedinformationspacesbutalsotopossiblyexplaintheontology ofthephysicalasitselfderivedfromtheinformational(aversionof “itfrombit”theory).Inasomewhatsimilarvein,Gregg Rosenberghas(2004)proposedanaccountofconsciousnessthat simultaneouslyaddressestheultimatecategoricalbasisofcausal relations.Inboththecausalcaseandtheconsciouscase,Rosenberg arguestherelational-functionalfactsmustultimatelydependupona categoricalnon-relationalbase,andheoffersamodelaccordingto whichcausalrelationsandqualitativephenomenalfactsbothdepend uponthesamebase.Also,asnotedjustabove(section9.8),some quantumtheoriestreatconsciousnessasafundamentalfeatureof reality(Stapp1993),andinsofarastheydoso,theymightbe plausiblyclassifiedasnon-physicaltheoriesaswell. 10.Conclusion Acomprehensiveunderstandingofconsciousnesswilllikelyrequire theoriesofmanytypes.Onemightusefullyandwithoutcontradiction acceptadiversityofmodelsthateachintheirownwayaim respectivelytoexplainthephysical,neural,cognitive,functional, representationalandhigher-orderaspectsofconsciousness.Thereis unlikelytobeanysingletheoreticalperspectivethatsufficesfor explainingallthefeaturesofconsciousnessthatwewishto understand.Thusasyntheticandpluralisticapproachmayprovidethe bestroadtofutureprogress. 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