Deterrence theory - Wikipedia

The concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of threats in limited force by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of ... Deterrencetheory FromWikipedia,thefreeencyclopedia Jumptonavigation Jumptosearch MilitarystrategyduringtheColdWarwithregardtotheuseofnuclearweapons ThisarticleisaboutDeterrenttheoriesofwarandnuclearweapons.Forlegaltheoryofjustice,seeDeterrence(penology). 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Deterrencetheoryreferstoscholarshipandpracticeonhowthreatsorlimitedforcebyonepartycanconvinceanotherpartytorefrainfrominitiatingsomecourseofaction.ThetopicgainedincreasedprominenceasamilitarystrategyduringtheColdWarwithregardtotheuseofnuclearweaponsandisrelatedtobutdistinctfromtheconceptofmutualassureddestruction,whichmodelsthepreventativenatureoffull-scalenuclearattackthatwoulddevastatebothpartiesinanuclearwar.Thecentralproblemofdeterrencerevolvesaroundhowtocrediblythreatenmilitaryactionornuclearpunishmentontheadversarydespiteitscoststothedeterrer.[1] Deterrenceiswidelydefinedasanyuseofthreats(implicitorexplicit)orlimitedforceintendedtodissuadeanactorfromtakinganaction(i.e.maintainthestatusquo).[2][3]Deterrenceisunlikecompellence,whichistheattempttogetanactor(suchasastate)totakeanaction(i.e.alterthestatusquo).[4][5][3]Bothareformsofcoercion.Compellencehasbeencharacterizedashardertosuccessfullyimplementthandeterrence.[5][6]Deterrencealsotendstobedistinguishedfromdefenseortheuseoffullforceinwartime.[2] Deterrenceismostlikelytobesuccessfulwhenaprospectiveattackerbelievesthattheprobabilityofsuccessislowandthecostsofattackarehigh.[7]Thecentralproblemofdeterrenceistocrediblycommunicatethreats.[8][3]Deterrencedoesnotnecessarilyrequiremilitarysuperiority.[9][10] "Generaldeterrence"isconsideredsuccessfulwhenanactorwhomightotherwisetakeanactionrefrainsfromdoingsoduetotheconsequencesthatthedeterrerisperceivedlikelytotake.[11]"Immediatedeterrence"isconsideredsuccessfulwhenanactorseriouslycontemplatingimmediatemilitaryforceoractionrefrainsfromdoingso.[11]Scholarsdistinguishbetween"extendeddeterrence"(theprotectionofallies)and"directdeterrence"(protectionofoneself).[10]Rationaldeterrencetheoryholdsthatanattackerwillbedeterrediftheybelievethat[12]:(ProbabilityofdeterrercarryingoutdeterrentthreatxCostsifthreatcarriedout)>(ProbabilityoftheattackeraccomplishingtheactionxBenefitsoftheaction)Thismodelisfrequentlysimplifiedas:CostsxP(Costs)>BenefitsxP(Benefits) Contents 1History 2Concept 2.1Proportionality 2.2Reciprocity 2.3Coercivecredibility 3Rationaldeterrencetheory 3.1Militarybalance 3.2Signalingandbargainingpower 3.3Reputationsforresolve 3.4Interestsatstake 3.5Tripwires 4Nucleardeterrencetheory 4.1StagesofUSpolicyofdeterrence 4.1.1Containment 4.1.2Détente 4.1.3Reaganera 5Cyberdeterrence 6Criticism 7Seealso 8Notes 9References 10Furtherreading 11Externallinks History[edit] Mostoftheinnovativeworkondeterrencetheoryoccurredfromthelate1940stomid-1960s.[13]Historically,scholarshipondeterrencehastendedtofocusonnucleardeterrence.[14]SincetheendoftheColdWar,therehasbeenanextensionofdeterrencescholarshiptoareasthatarenotspecificallyaboutnuclearweapons.[3] Adistinctionissometimesmadebetweennucleardeterrenceand"conventionaldeterrence."[15][16][17][18] Thetwomostprominentdeterrentstrategiesare"denial"(denyingtheattackthebenefitsofattack)and"punishment"(inflictingcostsontheattacker).[9] Concept[edit] Theuseofmilitarythreatsasameanstodeterinternationalcrisesandwarhasbeenacentraltopicofinternationalsecurityresearchforatleast200years.[19]Researchhasfocusedpredominantlyonthetheoryofrationaldeterrencetoanalyzetheconditionsunderwhichconventionaldeterrenceislikelytosucceedorfail.Alternativetheories,however,havechallengedtherationaldeterrencetheoryandhavefocusedonorganizationaltheoryandcognitivepsychology.[20] Theconceptofdeterrencecanbedefinedastheuseofthreatsinlimitedforcebyonepartytoconvinceanotherpartytorefrainfrominitiatingsomecourseofaction.[21][2]Athreatservesasadeterrenttotheextentthatitconvincesitstargetnottocarryouttheintendedactionbecauseofthecostsandlossesthattargetwouldincur.Ininternationalsecurity,apolicyofdeterrencegenerallyreferstothreatsofmilitaryretaliationdirectedbytheleadersofonestatetotheleadersofanotherinanattempttopreventtheotherstatefromresortingtotheuseofmilitaryforceinpursuitofitsforeignpolicygoals. AsoutlinedbyHuth,[21]apolicyofdeterrencecanfitintotwobroadcategories:preventinganarmedattackagainstastate'sownterritory(knownasdirectdeterrence)orpreventinganarmedattackagainstanotherstate(knownasextendeddeterrence).SituationsofdirectdeterrenceoftenoccurifthereisaterritorialdisputebetweenneighboringstatesinwhichmajorpowersliketheUnitedStatesdonotdirectlyintervene.Ontheotherhand,situationsofextendeddeterrenceoftenoccurwhenagreatpowerbecomesinvolved.Thelattercasehasgeneratedmostinterestinacademicliterature.Buildingonthetwobroadcategories,Huthgoesontooutlinethatdeterrencepoliciesmaybeimplementedinresponsetoapressingshort-termthreat(knownasimmediatedeterrence)orasstrategytopreventamilitaryconflictorshort-termthreatfromarising(knownasgeneraldeterrence). Asuccessfuldeterrencepolicymustbeconsideredinmilitarytermsbutalsopoliticalterms:Internationalrelations,foreignpolicyanddiplomacy.Inmilitaryterms,deterrencesuccessreferstopreventingstateleadersfromissuingmilitarythreatsandactionsthatescalatepeacetimediplomaticandmilitaryco-operationintoacrisisormilitarizedconfrontationthatthreatensarmedconflictandpossiblywar.Thepreventionofcrisesofwars,however,isnottheonlyaimofdeterrence.Inaddition,defendingstatesmustbeabletoresistthepoliticalandthemilitarydemandsofapotentialattackingnation.Ifarmedconflictisavoidedatthepriceofdiplomaticconcessionstothemaximumdemandsofthepotentialattackingnationunderthethreatofwar,itcannotbeclaimedthatdeterrencehassucceeded. Furthermore,asJentlesonetal.[22]argue,twokeysetsoffactorsforsuccessfuldeterrenceareimportant:adefendingstatestrategythatbalancescrediblecoercionanddeftdiplomacyconsistentwiththethreecriteriaofproportionality,reciprocity,andcoercivecredibilityandminimizesinternationalanddomesticconstraintsandtheextentofanattackingstate'svulnerabilityasshapedbyitsdomesticpoliticalandeconomicconditions.Inbroadterms,astatewishingtoimplementastrategyofdeterrenceismostlikelytosucceedifthecostsofnoncompliancethatitcanimposeonandthebenefitsofcomplianceitcanoffertoanotherstatearegreaterthanthebenefitsofnoncomplianceandthecostsofcompliance. Deterrencetheoryholdsthatnuclearweaponsareintendedtodeterotherstatesfromattackingwiththeirnuclearweapons,throughthepromiseofretaliationandpossiblymutuallyassureddestruction.Nucleardeterrencecanalsobeappliedtoanattackbyconventionalforces.Forexample,thedoctrineofmassiveretaliationthreatenedtolaunchUSnuclearweaponsinresponsetoSovietattacks. Asuccessfulnucleardeterrentrequiresacountrytopreserveitsabilitytoretaliatebyrespondingbeforeitsownweaponsaredestroyedorensuringasecond-strikecapability.Anucleardeterrentissometimescomposedofanucleartriad,asinthecaseofthenuclearweaponsownedbytheUnitedStates,Russia,theChinaandIndia.Othercountries,suchastheUnitedKingdomandFrance,haveonlysea-basedandair-basednuclearweapons. Proportionality[edit] Jentlesonetal.providesfurtherdetailinrelationtothosefactors.[22]Proportionalityreferstotherelationshipbetweenthedefendingstate'sscopeandnatureoftheobjectivesbeingpursuedandtheinstrumentsavailableforusetopursuethem.Themorethedefendingstatedemandsofanotherstate,thehigherthatstate'scostsofcomplianceandthegreaterneedforthedefendingstate'sstrategytoincreasethecostsofnoncomplianceandthebenefitsofcompliance.Thatisachallenge,asdeterrenceisbydefinitionastrategyoflimitedmeans.George(1991)goesontoexplainthatdeterrencesometimesgoesbeyondthreatstotheactualuseofmilitaryforce,butifforceisactuallyused,itmustbelimitedandfallshortoffull-scaleusetosucceed.[23] Themainsourceofdisproportionalityisanobjectivethatgoesbeyondpolicychangetoregimechange,whichhasbeenseeninLibya,Iraq,andNorthKorea.There,defendingstateshavesoughttochangetheleadershipofastateandtopolicychangesrelatingprimarilytotheirnuclearweaponsprograms. Reciprocity[edit] Secondly,Jentlesonetal.[22]outlinesthatreciprocityinvolvesanexplicitunderstandingoflinkagebetweenthedefendingstate'scarrotsandtheattackingstate'sconcessions.Thebalanceliesinnotofferingtoolittle,toolateorfortoomuchinreturnandnotofferingtoomuch,toosoon,orfortoolittlereturn. Coercivecredibility[edit] Finally,coercivecredibilityrequiresthatinadditiontocalculationsaboutcostsandbenefitsofco-operation,thedefendingstateconvincinglyconveystotheattackingstatethatfailuretoco-operatehasconsequences.Threats,usesofforce,andothercoerciveinstrumentssuchaseconomicsanctionsmustbesufficientlycredibletoraisetheattackingstate'sperceivedcostsofnoncompliance.Adefendingstatehavingasuperiormilitarycapabilityoreconomicstrengthinitselfisnotenoughtoensurecredibility.Indeed,allthreeelementsofabalanceddeterrencestrategyaremorelikelytobeachievedifothermajorinternationalactorsliketheUNorNATOaresupportive,andoppositionwithinthedefendingstate'sdomesticpoliticsislimited. TheotherimportantconsiderationsoutlinedbyJentlesonetal.[22]thatmustbetakenintoconsiderationisthedomesticpoliticalandeconomicconditionsintheattackingstateaffectingitsvulnerabilitytodeterrencepoliciesandtheattackingstate'sabilitytocompensateunfavourablepowerbalances.Thefirstfactoriswhetherinternalpoliticalsupportandregimesecurityarebetterservedbydefiance,ortherearedomesticpoliticalgainstobemadefromimprovingrelationswiththedefendingstate.Thesecondfactorisaneconomiccalculationofthecoststhatmilitaryforce,sanctions,andothercoerciveinstrumentscanimposeandthebenefitsthattradeandothereconomicincentivesmaycarry.Thatispartlyafunctionofthestrengthandflexibilityoftheattackingstate'sdomesticeconomyanditscapacitytoabsorborcounterthecostsbeingimposed.Thethirdfactoristheroleofelitesandotherkeydomesticpoliticalfigureswithintheattackingstate.Totheextentthatsuchactors'interestsarethreatenedwiththedefendingstate'sdemands,theyacttopreventorblockthedefendingstate'sdemands. Rationaldeterrencetheory[edit] Oneapproachtotheorizingaboutdeterrencehasentailedtheuseofrationalchoiceandgame-theoreticmodelsofdecisionmaking(seegametheory).Rationaldeterrencetheoryentails:[24] Rationality:actorsarerational[10] Unitaryactorassumption:actorsareunderstoodasunitary[10] Dyads:interactionstendtobebetweendyads(ortriads)ofstates Strategicinteractions:actorsconsiderthechoicesofotheractors[10] Cost-benefitcalculations:outcomesreflectactors'cost-benefitcalculations[10][25] Deterrencetheoristshaveconsistentlyarguedthatdeterrencesuccessismorelikelyifadefendingstate'sdeterrentthreatiscredibletoanattackingstate.Huth[21]outlinesthatathreatisconsideredcredibleifthedefendingstatepossessesboththemilitarycapabilitiestoinflictsubstantialcostsonanattackingstateinanarmedconflict,andtheattackingstatebelievesthatthedefendingstateisresolvedtouseitsavailablemilitaryforces.Huth[21]goesontoexplainthefourkeyfactorsforconsiderationunderrationaldeterrencetheory:themilitarybalance,signalingandbargainingpower,reputationsforresolve,interestsatstake. TheAmericaneconomistThomasSchellingbroughthisbackgroundingametheorytothesubjectofstudyinginternationaldeterrence.Schelling's(1966)classicworkondeterrencepresentstheconceptthatmilitarystrategycannolongerbedefinedasthescienceofmilitaryvictory.Instead,itisarguedthatmilitarystrategywasnowequally,ifnotmore,theartofcoercion,intimidationanddeterrence.[26]Schellingsaysthecapacitytoharmanotherstateisnowusedasamotivatingfactorforotherstatestoavoiditandinfluenceanotherstate'sbehavior.Tobecoerciveordeteranotherstate,violencemustbeanticipatedandavoidablebyaccommodation.Itcanthereforebesummarizedthattheuseofthepowertohurtasbargainingpoweristhefoundationofdeterrencetheoryandismostsuccessfulwhenitisheldinreserve.[26] InanarticlecelebratingSchelling'sNobelMemorialPrizeforEconomics,[27]MichaelKinsley,WashingtonPostop‑edcolumnistandoneofSchelling'sformerstudents,anecdotallysummarizesSchelling'sreorientationofgametheorythus:"[Y]ou'restandingattheedgeofacliff,chainedbytheankletosomeoneelse.You'llbereleased,andoneofyouwillgetalargeprize,assoonastheothergivesin.Howdoyoupersuadetheotherguytogivein,whentheonlymethodatyourdisposal—threateningtopushhimoffthecliff—woulddoomyouboth?Answer:Youstartdancing,closerandclosertotheedge.Thatway,youdon'thavetoconvincehimthatyouwoulddosomethingtotallyirrational:plungehimandyourselfoffthecliff.Youjusthavetoconvincehimthatyouarepreparedtotakeahigherriskthanheisofaccidentallyfallingoffthecliff.Ifyoucandothat,youwin." Militarybalance[edit] Deterrenceisoftendirectedagainststateleaderswhohavespecificterritorialgoalsthattheyseektoattaineitherbyseizingdisputedterritoryinalimitedmilitaryattackorbyoccupyingdisputedterritoryafterthedecisivedefeatoftheadversary'sarmedforces.Ineithercase,thestrategicorientationofpotentialattackingstatesgenerallyisfortheshorttermandisdrivenbyconcernsaboutmilitarycostandeffectiveness.Forsuccessfuldeterrence,defendingstatesneedthemilitarycapacitytorespondquicklyandstronglytoarangeofcontingencies.Deterrenceoftenfailsifeitheradefendingstateoranattackingstateunderestimatesoroverestimatestheother'sabilitytoundertakeaparticularcourseofaction. Signalingandbargainingpower[edit] Thecentralproblemforastatethatseekstocommunicateacredibledeterrentthreatbydiplomaticormilitaryactionsisthatalldefendingstateshaveanincentivetoactasiftheyaredeterminedtoresistanattackinthehopethattheattackingstatewillbackawayfrommilitaryconflictwithaseeminglyresolvedadversary.Ifalldefendingstateshavesuchincentives,potentialattackingstatesmaydiscountstatementsmadebydefendingstatesalongwithanymovementofmilitaryforcesasmerelybluffs.Inthatregard,rationaldeterrencetheoristshavearguedthatcostlysignalsarerequiredtocommunicatethecredibilityofadefendingstate'sresolve.Thoseareactionsandstatementsthatclearlyincreasetheriskofamilitaryconflictandalsoincreasethecostsofbackingdownfromadeterrentthreat.Statesthatbluffareunwillingtocrossacertainthresholdofthreatandmilitaryactionforfearofcommittingthemselvestoanarmedconflict. Reputationsforresolve[edit] Mainarticle:Credibility(internationalrelations) Therearethreedifferentargumentsthathavebeendevelopedinrelationtotheroleofreputationsininfluencingdeterrenceoutcomes.Thefirstargumentfocusesonadefendingstate'spastbehaviorininternationaldisputesandcrises,whichcreatesstrongbeliefsinapotentialattackingstateaboutthedefendingstate'sexpectedbehaviourinfutureconflicts.Thecredibilitiesofadefendingstate'spoliciesarearguablylinkedovertime,andreputationsforresolvehaveapowerfulcausalimpactonanattackingstate'sdecisionwhethertochallengeeithergeneralorimmediatedeterrence.Thesecondapproacharguesthatreputationshavealimitedimpactondeterrenceoutcomesbecausethecredibilityofdeterrenceisheavilydeterminedbythespecificconfigurationofmilitarycapabilities,interestsatstake,andpoliticalconstraintsfacedbyadefendingstateinagivensituationofattempteddeterrence.Theargumentofthatschoolofthoughtisthatpotentialattackingstatesarenotlikelytodrawstronginferencesaboutadefendingstatesresolvefrompriorconflictsbecausepotentialattackingstatesdonotbelievethatadefendingstate'spastbehaviourisareliablepredictoroffuturebehavior.Thethirdapproachisamiddlegroundbetweenthefirsttwoapproachesandarguesthatpotentialattackingstatesarelikelytodrawreputationalinferencesaboutresolvefromthepastbehaviourofdefendingstatesonlyundercertainconditions.Theinsightistheexpectationthatdecisionmakersuseonlycertaintypesofinformationwhendrawinginferencesaboutreputations,andanattackingstateupdatesandrevisesitsbeliefswhenadefendingstate'sunanticipatedbehaviorcannotbeexplainedbycase-specificvariables. Anexampleshowsthattheproblemextendstotheperceptionofthethirdpartiesaswellasmainadversariesandunderliesthewayinwhichattemptsatdeterrencecanfailandevenbackfireiftheassumptionsabouttheothers'perceptionsareincorrect.[28] Interestsatstake[edit] Althoughcostlysignalingandbargainingpoweraremorewellestablishedargumentsinrationaldeterrencetheory,theinterestsofdefendingstatesarenotaswellknown.Attackingstatesmaylookbeyondtheshort-termbargainingtacticsofadefendingstateandseektodeterminewhatinterestsareatstakeforthedefendingstatethatwouldjustifytherisksofamilitaryconflict.Theargumentisthatdefendingstatesthathavegreaterinterestsatstakeinadisputearemoreresolvedtouseforceandmorewillingtoenduremilitarylossestosecurethoseinterests.Evenlesswell-establishedargumentsarethespecificintereststhataremoresalienttostateleaderssuchasmilitaryinterestsandeconomicinterests. Furthermore,Huth[21]arguesthatbothsupportersandcriticsofrationaldeterrencetheoryagreethatanunfavorableassessmentofthedomesticandinternationalstatusquobystateleaderscanundermineorseverelytestthesuccessofdeterrence.Inarationalchoiceapproach,iftheexpectedutilityofnotusingforceisreducedbyadecliningstatusquoposition,deterrencefailureismorelikelysincethealternativeoptionofusingforcebecomesrelativelymoreattractive. Tripwires[edit] InternationalrelationsscholarsDanReiterandPaulPoasthavearguedthatso-called"tripwires"donotdeteraggression.[29]Tripwiresentailthatsmallforcesaredeployedabroadwiththeassumptionthatanattackonthemwilltriggeragreaterdeploymentofforces.[29]DanAltmanhasarguedthattripwiresdoworktodeteraggression,citingtheWesterndeploymentofforcestoBerlinin1948–1949todeterSovietaggressionasasuccessfulexample.[30] Nucleardeterrencetheory[edit] Mainarticles:Nuclearstrategy,Massiveretaliation,Mutualassureddestruction,andFlexibleresponse In1966,Schelling[26]isprescriptiveinoutliningtheimpactofthedevelopmentofnuclearweaponsintheanalysisofmilitarypoweranddeterrence.Inhisanalysis,beforethewidespreaduseofassuredsecondstrikecapability,orimmediatereprisal,intheformofSSBNsubmarines,Schellingarguesthatnuclearweaponsgivenationsthepotentialtodestroytheirenemiesbutalsotherestofhumanitywithoutdrawingimmediatereprisalbecauseofthelackofaconceivabledefensesystemandthespeedwithwhichnuclearweaponscanbedeployed.Anation'scrediblethreatofsuchseveredamageempowerstheirdeterrencepoliciesandfuelspoliticalcoercionandmilitarydeadlock,whichcanproduceproxywarfare. Historicalanalysisofnuclearweaponsdeterrentcapabilitieshasledmodernresearcherstotheconceptofthestability–instabilityparadox.Nuclearweaponsconferlarge-scalestabilitybetweennuclearweaponstates,asinover60years,nonehasengagedinlarge-scaledirectwarfare,primarilybecauseofnuclearweaponsdeterrencecapabilities,buttheyareforcedintopursuingpoliticalaimsbymilitarymeansintheformofcomparativelysmallerscaleactsofinstability,suchasproxywarsandminorconflicts. StagesofUSpolicyofdeterrence[edit] TheUSpolicyofdeterrenceduringtheColdWarunderwentsignificantvariations. Containment[edit] TheearlystagesoftheColdWarweregenerallycharacterizedbythecontainmentofcommunism,anaggressivestanceonbehalfoftheUSespeciallyondevelopingnationsunderitssphereofinfluence.Theperiodwascharacterizedbynumerousproxywarsthroughoutmostoftheglobe,particularlyAfrica,Asia,CentralAmerica,andSouthAmerica.OnenotableconflictwastheKoreanWar.GeorgeF.Kennan,whoistakentobethefounderofthispolicyinhisLongTelegram,assertedthatheneveradvocatedmilitaryintervention,merelyeconomicsupport,andthathisideasweremisinterpretedasespousedbythegeneralpublic. Détente[edit] WiththeSdrawdownfromVietnam,thenormalizationofUSrelationswithChina,andtheSino-SovietSplit,thepolicyofcontainmentwasabandonedandanewpolicyofdétentewasestablished,withpeacefulco-existencewassoughtbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.Althoughallofthosefactorscontributedtothisshift,themostimportantfactorwasprobablytheroughparityachievedinstockpilingnuclearweaponswiththeclearcapabilityofmutualassureddestruction(MAD).Therefore,theperiodofdétentewascharacterizedbyageneralreductioninthetensionbetweentheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatesandathawingoftheColdWar,whichlastedfromthelate1960suntilthestartofthe1980s.ThedoctrineofmutualnucleardeterrencethencharacterizedrelationsbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionandrelationswithRussiauntiltheonsetoftheNewColdWarintheearly2010s.Sincethen,relationshavebeenlessclear. Reaganera[edit] AthirdshiftoccurredwithUSPresidentRonaldReagan'sarmsbuild-upduringthe1980s.ReaganattemptedtojustifythepolicybyconcernsofgrowingSovietinfluenceinLatinAmericaandtheregimeinIran,whichwasestablishedaftertheIranianRevolutionof1979.Similartotheoldpolicyofcontainment,theUSfundedseveralproxywars,includingsupportforSaddamHusseinofIraqduringtheIran–IraqWar,supportforthemujahideeninAfghanistan,whowerefightingforindependencefromtheSovietUnion,andseveralanticommunistmovementsinLatinAmericasuchastheoverthrowoftheSandinistagovernmentinNicaragua.ThefundingoftheContrasinNicaragualedtotheIran-ContraAffair,whileovertsupportledtoarulingfromtheInternationalCourtofJusticeagainsttheUnitedStatesinNicaraguav.UnitedStates. WhilethearmywasdealingwiththebreakupoftheSovietUnionandthespreadofnucleartechnologytoothernationsbeyondtheUnitedStatesandRussia,theconceptofdeterrencetookonabroadermultinationaldimension.TheUSpolicyondeterrenceaftertheColdWarwasoutlinedin1995inthedocumentcalled"EssentialsofPost–ColdWarDeterrence."[31]ItexplainsthatwhilerelationswithRussiacontinuetofollowthetraditionalcharacteristicsofMAD,buttheUSpolicyofdeterrencetowardsnationswithminornuclearcapabilitiesshouldensurebythreatsofimmenseretaliation(orevenpre-emptiveaction)nottothreatentheUnitedStates,itsinterests,orallies.Thedocumentexplainsthatsuchthreatsmustalsobeusedtoensurethatnationswithoutnucleartechnologyrefrainfromdevelopingnuclearweaponsandthatauniversalbanprecludesanynationfrommaintainingchemicalorbiologicalweapons.ThecurrenttensionswithIranandNorthKoreaovertheirnuclearprogramsarecausedpartlybythecontinuationofthepolicyofdeterrence. Cyberdeterrence[edit] Mainarticles:CyberwarfareandCyberweapon Sincetheearly2000s,therehasbeenanincreasedfocusoncyberdeterrence.Cyberdeterrencehastwomeanings[32]: Theuseofcyberactionstodeterotherstates Thedeterrenceofanadversary'scyberoperations Scholarshavedebatedhowcybercapabilitiesaltertraditionalunderstandingsofdeterrence,giventhatitmaybehardertoattributeresponsibilityforcyberattacks,thebarrierstoentrymaybelower,therisksandcostsmaybelowerforactorswhoconductcyberattacks,itmaybehardertosignalandinterpretintentions,theadvantageofoffenseoverdefense,andweakactorsandnon-stateactorscandevelopconsiderablecybercapabilities.[32][33][34][35]Scholarshavealsodebatedthefeasibilityoflaunchinghighlydamagingcyberattacksandengagingindestructivecyberwarfare,withmostscholarsexpressingskepticismthatcybercapabilitieshaveenhancedtheabilityofstatestolaunchhighlydestructiveattacks.[36][37][38]ThemostprominentcyberattacktodateistheStuxnetattackonIran'snuclearprogram.[36][37]By2019,theonlypubliclyacknowledgedcaseofacyberattackcausingapoweroutagewasthe2015Ukrainepowergridhack.[39] Therearevariouswaystoengageincyberdeterrence[32][33][34]: Denial:preventingadversariesfromachievingmilitaryobjectivesbydefendingagainstthem[35] Punishment:theimpositionofcostsontheadversary Norms:theestablishmentandmaintenanceofnormsthatestablishappropriatestandardsofbehavior[40][41] Escalation:raisingtheprobabilitythatcostswillbeimposedontheadversary[42] Entanglementandinterdependence:interdependencebetweenactorscanhaveadeterrenteffect[33][38] Thereisariskofunintendedescalationincyberspaceduetodifficultiesindiscerningtheintentofattackers,[43][44]andcomplexitiesinstate-hackerrelationships.[45]AccordingtopoliticalscientistsJosephBrownandTanishaFazal,statesfrequentlyneitherconfirmnordenyresponsibilityforcyberoperationssothattheycanavoidtheescalatoryrisks(thatcomewithpubliccredit)whilealsosignalingthattheyhavecybercapabilitiesandresolve(whichcanbeachievedifintelligenceagenciesandgovernmentsbelievetheywereresponsible).[42] AccordingtoLennartMaschmeyer,cyberweaponshavelimitedcoerciveeffectivenessduetoatrilemma"wherebyspeed,intensity,andcontrolarenegativelycorrelated.Theseconstraintsposeatrilemmaforactorsbecauseagaininonevariabletendstoproducelossesacrosstheothertwovariables."[46] Criticism[edit] Deterrencetheoryiscriticizedforitsassumptionsaboutopponentrationales.Acrediblenucleardeterrent,BernardBrodiewrotein1959,mustbealwaysreadybutneverused.[47][a] Itisarguedthatsuicidalorpsychoticopponentsmaynotbedeterredbyeitherformsofdeterrence.[48]Also,diplomaticmisunderstandingsand/oropposingpoliticalideologiesmayleadtoescalatingmutualperceptionsofthreatandasubsequentarmsracethatelevatestheriskofactualwar,ascenarioillustratedinthemoviesWarGames(1983)andDr.Strangelove(1964).Anarmsraceisinefficientinitsoptimaloutput,asallcountriesinvolvedexpendresourcesonarmamentsthatwouldnothavebeencreatediftheothershadnotexpendedresources,aformofpositivefeedback.Besides,escalationofperceivedthreatcanmakeiteasierforcertainmeasurestobeinflictedonapopulationbyitsgovernment,suchasrestrictionsoncivilliberties,thecreationofamilitary–industrialcomplex,andmilitaryexpendituresresultinginhighertaxesandincreasingbudgetdeficits. Inrecentyears,manymainstreampoliticians,academicanalysts,andretiredmilitaryleadershavealsocriticizeddeterrenceandadvocatednucleardisarmament.SamNunn,WilliamPerry,HenryKissinger,andGeorgeShultzhaveallcalledupongovernmentstoembracethevisionofaworldfreeofnuclearweapons,andinthreeWallStreetJournalop-edsproposedanambitiousprogramofurgentstepstothatend.ThefourhavecreatedtheNuclearSecurityProjecttoadvancethatagenda.OrganisationssuchasGlobalZero,aninternationalnon-partisangroupof300worldleadersdedicatedtoachievingnucleardisarmament,havealsobeenestablished.[49]In2010,thefourwerefeaturedinadocumentaryfilmentitledNuclearTippingPoint.ThefilmisavisualandhistoricaldepictionoftheideaslaidforthintheWallStreetJournalop-edsandreinforcestheircommitmenttoaworldwithoutnuclearweaponsandthestepsthatcanbetakentoreachthatgoal.[50][51] Kissingerputsthenewdanger,whichcannotbeaddressedbydeterrence,thisway:"Theclassicalnotionofdeterrencewasthattherewassomeconsequencesbeforewhichaggressorsandevildoerswouldrecoil.Inaworldofsuicidebombers,thatcalculationdoesn'toperateinanycomparableway."[52]Shultzsaid,"Ifyouthinkofthepeoplewhoaredoingsuicideattacks,andpeoplelikethatgetanuclearweapon,theyarealmostbydefinitionnotdeterrable."[53] Asopposedtotheextrememutuallyassureddestructionformofdeterrence,theconceptofminimumdeterrenceinwhichastatepossessesnomorenuclearweaponsthanisnecessarytodeteranadversaryfromattackingispresentlythemostcommonformofdeterrencepracticedbynuclearweaponstates,suchasChina,India,Pakistan,Britain,andFrance.[54]PursuingminimaldeterrenceduringarmsnegotiationsbetweentheUnitedStatesandRussiaallowseachstatetomakenuclearstockpilereductionswithoutthestatebecomingvulnerable,butithasbeennotedthattherecomesapointthatfurtherreductionsmaybeundesirable,onceminimaldeterrenceisreached,asfurtherreductionsbeyondthatpointincreaseastate'svulnerabilityandprovideanincentiveforanadversarytoexpanditsnucleararsenalsecretly.[55] "SeniorEuropeanstatesmenandwomen"calledforfurtheractioninaddressingproblemsofnuclearweaponsproliferationin2010:"Nucleardeterrenceisafarlesspersuasivestrategicresponsetoaworldofpotentialregionalnucleararmsracesandnuclearterrorismthanitwastothecoldwar."[56] PaulViriliocriticizednucleardeterrenceasanachronisticintheageofinformationwarfaresincedisinformationandkompromatarethecurrentthreatstosuggestiblepopulations.Hecallsthewoundinflictedonunsuspectingpopulationsan"integralaccident: Thefirstdeterrence,nucleardeterrence,ispresentlybeingsupersededbytheseconddeterrence:atypeofdeterrencebasedonwhatIcall'theinformationbomb'associatedwiththenewweaponryofinformationandcommunicationstechnologies.Thus,intheverynearfuture,andIstressthisimportantpoint,itwillnolongerbewarthatisthecontinuationofpoliticsbyothermeans,itwillbewhatIhavedubbed'theintegralaccident'thatisthecontinuationofpoliticsbyothermeans.[57] Aformerdeputydefensesecretaryandstrategicarmstreatynegotiator,PaulNitze,statedinaWashingtonPostop-edin1994thatnuclearweaponswereobsoleteinthe"newworlddisorder"afterthedissolutionoftheSovietUnion,andheadvocatedrelianceonprecisionguidedmunitionstosecureapermanentmilitaryadvantageoverfutureadversaries.[58] In2004,FrankC.Zagaremadethecasethatdeterrencetheoryislogicallyinconsistent,notempiricallyaccurate,andthatitisdeficientasatheory.Inplaceofclassicaldeterrence,rationalchoicescholarshavearguedforperfectdeterrence,whichassumesthatstatesmayvaryintheirinternalcharacteristicsandespeciallyinthecredibilityoftheirthreatsofretaliation.[59] InaJanuary2007articleinTheWallStreetJournal,veteranColdWarpolicymakersHenryKissinger,BillPerry,GeorgeShultz,andSamNunnreversedtheirpreviouspositionandassertedthatfarfrommakingtheworldsafer,nuclearweaponshadbecomeasourceofextremerisk.[60]Theirrationaleandconclusionwasbasednotontheoldworldwithonlyafewnuclearplayersbutontheinstabilityinmanystateswiththetechnologiesandthelackofwherewithalforthepropermaintenanceandupgradingofexistingweapons: Theriskofaccidents,misjudgmentsorunauthorisedlaunches,theyargued,wasgrowingmoreacuteinaworldofrivalriesbetweenrelativelynewnuclearstatesthatlackedthesecuritysafeguardsdevelopedovermanyyearsbyAmericaandtheSovietUnion.Theemergenceofpariahstates,suchasNorthKorea(possiblysoontobejoinedbyIran),armedwithnuclearweaponswasaddingtothefearaswasthedeclaredambitionofterroriststosteal,buyorbuildanucleardevice.[60]— TheEconomist,June16,2011 AccordingtoTheEconomist,"SeniorEuropeanstatesmenandwomen"calledforfurtheractionin2010inaddressingproblemsofnuclearweaponsproliferation:"Nucleardeterrenceisafarlesspersuasivestrategicresponsetoaworldofpotentialregionalnucleararmsracesandnuclearterrorismthanitwastothecoldwar."[56] Seealso[edit] Balanceofterror Chainstoreparadox Confidence-buildingmeasures Decapitationstrike Internationalrelations Launchonwarning LongPeace MetalGearSolid:PeaceWalker N-deterrence Nuclearblackmail Nuclearethics Nuclearpeace Nuclearstrategy Nuclearterrorism Nuclearwarfare Peacethroughstrength Prisoner'sdilemma ReaganDoctrine Securitydilemma Tripwireforce Wargaming Notes[edit] ^DefinitionofdeterrencefromtheDictionaryofModernStrategyandTacticsbyMichaelKeane:"Thepreventionorinhibitionofactionbroughtaboutbyfearoftheconsequences.Deterrenceisastateofmindbroughtaboutbytheexistenceofacrediblethreatofunacceptablecounteraction.Itassumesandrequiresrationaldecisionmakers." 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"U.S.DepartmentofDefense'sDeterrenceOperationsJointOperatingConcept".Archivedfromtheoriginal(Word)on2012-01-18.Retrieved2011-10-11. Furtherreading[edit] Schultz,GeorgeP.andGoodby,JamesE.TheWarthatMustNeverbeFought,HooverPress,ISBN 978-0-8179-1845-3,2015. Freedman,Lawrence.2004.Deterrence.NewYork:PolityPress. Jervis,Robert,RichardN.LebowandJaniceG.Stein.1985.PsychologyandDeterrence.Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.270pp. Morgan,Patrick.2003.DeterrenceNow.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. T.V.Paul,PatrickM.Morgan,JamesJ.Wirtz,ComplexDeterrence:StrategyIntheGlobalAge(UniversityofChicagoPress,2009)ISBN 978-0-226-65002-9. GarciaCovarrubias,Jaime."TheSignificanceofConventionalDeterrenceinLatinAmerica",March–April2004. Waltz,KennethN."NuclearMythsandPoliticalRealities".TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview.Vol.84,No.3(Sep,1990),pp. 731–746. Externallinks[edit] WikiversityhaslearningresourcesaboutSurveyresearchanddesigninpsychology/Tutorials/Multiplelinearregression/Exercises/Deterrencetheory NuclearDeterrenceTheoryandNuclearDeterrenceMyth,streamingvideoofalecturebyProfessorJohnVasquez,PrograminArmsControl,Disarmament,andInternationalSecurity(ACDIS),UniversityofIllinois,September17,2009. DeterrenceToday–Roles,Challenges,andResponses,analysisbyLewisA.Dunn,IFRIProliferationPapersn°19,2007 RevisitingNuclearDeterrenceTheorybyDonaldC.Whitmore –March1,1998 NuclearDeterrence,MissileDefenses,andGlobalInstabilitybyDavidKrieger,April2001 Bibliography MaintainingNuclearDeterrenceinthe21stCenturybytheSenateRepublicanPolicyCommittee NuclearFiles.orgDescriptionandanalysisofthenucleardeterrencetheory NuclearFiles.orgSpeechbyUSGeneralLeeButlerin1998ontheRisksofNuclearDeterrence NuclearFiles.orgSpeechbySirJosephRotblat,NobelPeaceLaureate,ontheEthicalDimensionsofDeterrence TheUniversalFormulaforSuccessfulDeterrencebyCharlesSutherland,2007.Apredictivetoolfordeterrencestrategies. WilltheEaglestrangletheDragon?,AnalysisofhowtheChinesenucleardeterrenceisalteredbytheU.S.BMDsystem,TrendsEastAsia,No.20,February2008. WhenisDeterrenceNecessary?GaugingAdversaryIntentbyGarySchaub,Jr.,StrategicStudiesQuarterly3,4(Winter2009) ThesignificanceofconventionaldeterrenceinLatinAmerica U.S.NuclearDeterrencePolicyUnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense AuthoritycontrolNationallibraries France(data) UnitedStates Other MicrosoftAcademic Retrievedfrom"https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Deterrence_theory&oldid=1055307789" Categories:ColdWarpoliciesColdWarterminologyDeterrencetheoryduringtheColdWarGeopoliticalterminologyInternationalrelationstheoryInternationalsecurityMilitarystrategyNuclearstrategyNuclearwarfareHiddencategories:CS1maint:multiplenames:authorslistArticleswithshortdescriptionShortdescriptionmatchesWikidataArticleswithBNFidentifiersArticleswithLCCNidentifiersArticleswithMAidentifiers Navigationmenu Personaltools NotloggedinTalkContributionsCreateaccountLogin Namespaces ArticleTalk Variants expanded collapsed Views ReadEditViewhistory More expanded collapsed Search Navigation MainpageContentsCurrenteventsRandomarticleAboutWikipediaContactusDonate Contribute HelpLearntoeditCommunityportalRecentchangesUploadfile Tools WhatlinkshereRelatedchangesUploadfileSpecialpagesPermanentlinkPageinformationCitethispageWikidataitem Print/export DownloadasPDFPrintableversion Languages العربيةAzərbaycancaCatalàČeštinaΕλληνικάEspañolفارسیFrançais한국어BahasaIndonesiaItalianoעבריתNederlands日本語PortuguêsРусскийSimpleEnglishسنڌيSrpskohrvatski/српскохрватскиTürkçeTiếngViệt中文 Editlinks